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 Problems and Recommendations 
Japan’s Security Policy:  
A Shift in Direction under Abe? 
Change is in the air in Japan under Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe. “Japan is back,” proclaimed the newly 
elected head of government in February 2013 during 
a visit to Washington. Two months earlier he had led 
the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) back to 
power after three years in opposition, winning a land-
slide victory in the Lower House election. For Abe it 
was a return to the highest office, which he had 
already occupied for one year in 2006/2007. In his sec-
ond term, the Prime Minister not only wants to halt 
Japan’s economic decline; he also intends to forestall 
any further deterioration in the country’s geopolitical 
significance and return Japan to its former strength. 
Abe secured another four-year term to pursue his pro-
posals in the Lower House snap election on 14 Decem-
ber 2014. 
While Abe’s economic policy, known as “Abenom-
ics”, has garnered mixed reviews in the international 
press, his security policy has met with overwhelming 
disapproval. The right-wing nationalist Prime Minister 
has been reproached for departing from the tradition-
al tenets of Japanese security policy. His detractors 
point to his intention to reform the country’s pacifist 
post-war constitution. Specifically, several reforms 
introduced by Abe have given rise to concern, above 
all in China and South Korea: the first increase in the 
defense budget in years (in fiscal year 2013); the intro-
duction of a National Security Council and a Security 
Strategy (December 2013); the relaxation of arms 
export restrictions (April 2014); and the reinterpreta-
tion of the “peace clause” of the Constitution (July 
2014). To many observers, these developments con-
stitute a radical change in Japan’s security policy. 
The mistrust shown towards Abe is not surprising. 
He is a revisionist politician who downplays Japan’s 
responsibility for war and atrocities in the first half 
of the 20th century. In neighboring China and South 
Korea, which were hit particularly hard by Japanese 
aggression, suspicion over Abe’s security agenda runs 
deep. People sense danger when Tokyo lifts military 
restrictions in order to gain greater regional influence 
while at the same time glossing over its military 
history. Tokyo rejects such fears as unfounded and 
emphasizes its desire to actively contribute to inter-
national peace. 
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Problems and Recommendations 
The changes in Abe’s security policy must be seen 
within the context of the constantly shifting regional 
environment. Japan feels threatened above all by 
China, which is modernizing its military and asser-
tively pursuing its foreign policy, as well as by North 
Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Japan’s per-
ception of Russia, by contrast, is ambivalent. Nearly 
seventy years after the end of the Second World War, 
Tokyo has yet to conclude a peace treaty with Moscow. 
With the introduction of the National Security 
Council, Tokyo has found an institutional response 
to the security changes in its neighborhood. In terms 
of developing foreign policy strategy, the Security 
Council is unlikely to wield anywhere near as much 
influence as its American role model. Nevertheless, 
the NSC enables Tokyo to intensify its security co-
operation with the US and other countries. 
In strategy documents published under Abe, Japan’s 
security policy is for the first time ever subsumed 
under a leitmotif – “proactive pacifism”. The Prime 
Minister makes use of this concept to explicitly con-
tradict the idealistic pacifist notions of the post-war 
era and thus justify the easing of military constraints. 
The aim is to facilitate international cooperation in 
the fields of arms policy and military affairs. 
As in past publications, the new strategy docu-
ments define three central pillars of Japanese security 
policy: (1) Japan’s capacity to engage in peacekeeping, 
(2) its alliance with the US, and (3) cooperation with 
other countries. In all three areas Abe’s goals are 
wholly in line with those of former administrations, 
but he pursues them more vigorously. Particularly 
striking is the upgrading of the third pillar, inter-
national cooperation – a trend which had already 
become apparent in recent years. In general the fol-
lowing observations can be made: 
 A detailed analysis shows that international observ-
ers attach too much importance to the changes 
ushered in by Abe. Those who claim to discern semi-
nal changes or even a shift in direction fail to take 
into account the process of transformation and ad-
justment that Tokyo has been undergoing since as 
early as the end of the Cold War. Abe’s reforms are 
the logical consequence and result of Japan’s gradual 
realignment of its security policy, a process long 
underway. Even the controversial reinterpretation 
of the “peace clause” (Article 9) of the Constitution 
merely formalizes what is in fact already practiced. 
 Even though the Abe administration has relaxed 
military constraints, it would be a mistake to con-
strue this as the start of a new militarism. Japan’s 
population is extremely skeptical about the use of 
military power. It is to this public that Abe must 
answer and justify his actions. 
 The alliance with the US continues to receive top 
priority, but at the same time Tokyo has intensified 
its cooperation with partners like Australia, India 
and some Southeast Asian countries. By ceasing to 
align its security policy exclusively with the US, 
Japan has created new room for maneuver, even if 
scarce financial resources limit Tokyo’s ability to 
play a stronger security role in East Asia. The direc-
tion Japan’s security policy will take in the future 
also depends on whether it can manage to revive its 
stagnating economy. 
 Among Japan’s decision-makers there is a consensus 
that China and North Korea pose the greatest secu-
rity risk. Abe’s policy of ostracizing China, which 
distinguishes him from his predecessors, serves to 
aggravate rather than ease tensions. His emphasis 
in foreign policy statements on values such as de-
mocracy, rule of law and human rights has aroused 
suspicion in Beijing that Japan is pursuing a con-
tainment strategy. Absent a trusting, constructive 
relationship with China, Japan will not be able to 
sustainably improve the security situation in East 
Asia. 
 The current security debates in Japan and Germany 
reveal a series of parallels. Political decision-makers 
in both countries have called for more willingness 
to assume responsibility for international security, 
if necessary using military force. In doing so, they 
are responding to changes in the security environ-
ment and to growing expectations from the US and 
other partners. Despite the economic crisis, Japan is 
certain to remain one of the most important players 
in global politics. Germany and Europe should fos-
ter relations with this reliable, democratic partner. 
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The Power Shift: US Decline and the Rise of China 
The Security Environment 
 
Over the past decade Japan has felt increasingly threat-
ened in its regional environment. For Japanese secu-
rity experts, the greatest threat emanates from two 
countries – China, which is becoming increasingly 
assertive in its foreign policy and whose defense budg-
et continues to grow steadily, and North Korea with its 
nuclear and missile program. This perception is shared 
by the population. In a survey conducted in June/July 
2014, the majority of Japanese saw both North Korea 
and China as military threats (69 percent and 64 per-
cent, respectively) – far ahead of Russia, which was 
mentioned by only 25 percent of respondents.1 
Indeed, tensions flare regularly in East Asia. The 
causes include China’s rise, territorial conflicts such 
as those in the East and South China Seas, the fragile 
situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan 
Strait, and historical animosities. In addition, in the 
past few years defense spending has risen considerably 
in the region.2 Japan is disillusioned by the ineffectu-
ality of multilateral and security fora, which have thus 
far achieved little more than confidence-building and 
have done little to resolve or ease interstate conflicts.3 
On the whole, Japanese take a pessimistic view of their 
country’s security situation. According to a survey con-
ducted by the Cabinet Office in January 2012, 72 per-
cent of citizens at the time feared that Japan could be 
involved in a war, while 22 percent considered this 
risk remote or non-existent.4 
1  Dai jukkai nicchū yoron chōsa [Tenth Japanese-Chinese Opin-
ion Poll], ed. Genron-NPO and China Daily (9 September 2014), 
30, http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/2014forum.pdf (accessed 
20 September 2014). 
2  See, e.g., Sam Perlo-Freeman and Carina Solmirano, Trends 
in World Military Expenditure, 2013, SIPRI Factsheet (April 2014) 
http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=476 (accessed 
5 July 2014). 
3  Takeshi Yuzawa, “Japan’s Changing Conception of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum: From an Optimistic Liberal to a Pes-
simistic Realist Perspective”, Pacific Review 18, no. 4 (2005): 
463–97. 
4  Jieitai bōei mondai ni kansuru yoron chōsa [Survey on the Self-
Defense Forces and Defense Issues], ed. Cabinet Office (Janu-
ary 2012), http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h23/h23-bouei/2-6. 
html (accessed 1 July 2014). 
The Power Shift: 
US Decline and the Rise of China 
The central issue of Japanese foreign and security 
policy is the rapid rise of China and the resulting 
shift of power in the Asia Pacific Region. China has 
been achieving impressive economic growth rates 
for decades. In 2010 it surpassed Japan as the second-
largest economy in the world. Parallel to its economic 
rise, Beijing has been investing ever-larger sums in its 
military, primarily in its navy and air force, a develop-
ment which causes great unease in Japan. Since 1989 
China’s defense expenditures have been growing at a 
rate of more than 10 percent per year.5 The country’s 
official defense budget, at ¥13.4 trillion (approximate-
ly €102 billion) in 2014, is approximately three times 
that of Japan’s.6 Although Japan’s armed forces are 
technologically superior to China’s, this edge is steadi-
ly eroding. A study conducted by the Tokyo Founda-
tion, a foreign policy think tank, concludes that China 
will attain “overwhelming [military] superiority” over 
Japan in the near future.7 Experts believe that China’s 
defense expenditures could surpass even those of the 
US around 2030.8 
Japan, which has been stagnating for two decades, 
is thus facing an emerging China with growing eco-
nomic, political and military influence. The US, Japan’s 
most important ally, is suffering the effects of the real 
estate and financial crisis of 2008. President Obama 
has declared the Asia Pacific Region a top foreign 
policy priority and stated that the US presence there 
will remain unaffected by cuts in defense spending. 
But many Japanese are skeptical about the long-term 
commitment of the US in the region.9 Budget short-
5  “China Should Stop Its Dangerous Military Expansion”, 
Asahi Shimbun, 6 March 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/ 
views/editorial/AJ201403060028 (accessed 3 July 2014). 
6  Ibid. 
7  Japan’s Security Strategy toward China: Integration, Balancing 
and Deterrence in the Era of Power Shift, ed. Tokyo Foundation 
(Tokyo, October 2011), 27, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/ 
en/additional_info/security_strategy_toward_china.pdf 
(accessed 4 May 2014). 
8  Ibid., 26. 
9  Cf. Takashi Kawakami, “Beikoku no senraku kijiku no Ajia 
shifuto to nichibei dōmei” [The shift of the strategic axis 
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The Security Environment 
ages and the instability in the Middle East, it is feared, 
could force the US to reconsider its focus on Asia.10 
The general assumption in Tokyo is that the US is no 
longer willing to assume the role of global policeman 
after the military interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The fact that the US government has refrained 
from intervening militarily in the Ukraine conflict is 
regarded as evidence of this unwillingness. 
Some Japanese observers believe the power shift 
could in the medium to long term prompt Washing-
ton – despite existing differences of opinion and ten-
sions – to opt for a cooperative policy of strategic con-
cessions in dealing with Beijing (“strategic accommo-
dation”) in order to preserve US global influence.11 
This assessment is accompanied by concerns that 
the US could enter into agreements with China that 
disregard Japan’s interests or even run counter to 
them. Sino-American rapprochement was particularly 
feared after Obama’s inauguration in 2009, when the 
new US President announced closer cooperation with 
Beijing on regional and global issues. Although the 
US-Chinese relationship has cooled since then, Japan 
is still not ruling out the possibility that Washington 
will change course and begin accommodating China.12 
China’s Foreign Policy Behavior 
China is increasingly self-assured and assertive in pur-
suing its interests. Tokyo is particularly disquieted 
by the demonstrative presence of Chinese vessels and 
aircraft in the area of the Senkaku Islands (Chinese 
Diaoyu) in the East China Sea, which are controlled by 
Japan and claimed by China. In September 2010, the 
island dispute came to a head after the Japanese coast 
guard arrested the captain of a Chinese fishing boat 
toward Asia and the Japanese-US alliance], Kaigai Jijō, 5 Janu-
ary 2012, 55–72. 
10  Cf. Izuru Sugawara, Toshiyuki Yasui and Kaneko Masa-
fumi, “PHP gurōbaru risuku bunseki” [PHP Global Risk 
Analysis], in Seisaku Shinkutanku PHP Sōken, January 2011, 27f, 
http://research.php.co.jp/research/foreign_policy/pdf/PHP_ 
GlobalRisks_2012.pdf (accessed 2 May 2014). 
11  Ukeru Magosaki, “Nichibei dōmei o zettaishisubekarazu: 
beigun ga nihon o mamoru to kagiranai riyū” [The Japanese-
US alliance must not be taken for granted: Reasons why US 
forces will not necessarily support Japan], in Nihon no Ronten 
2012, ed. Bungei Shunju (Tokyo, 2012), 120–23. 
12  Ryo Asano, “Japan-China Relations in a Gray Zone: Search 
for Stability through Coercion and Deterrence”, in Japan under 
the Power Shift: Its Security in the 2010s, ed. Akio Watanabe (Tokyo: 
The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014), 69–89 (76). 
that had collided with two patrol boats in the dis-
puted waters around the islands. The Japanese govern-
ment’s decision in September 2012 to purchase three 
uninhabited islets from their private owner in order 
to prevent the right-wing nationalist mayor of Tokyo 
at the time, Shintaro Ishihara, from acquiring them, 
was construed by China as a provocation. Beijing 
deemed the purchase a violation of Chinese sovereign-
ty and a unilateral alteration of the status quo of the 
islands through “nationalization”. 
Since then Chinese aircraft and vessels have been 
active in the island area, where they violate Japanese 
airspace and intrude into Japanese territorial waters. 
The number of missions flown by Japan’s air force to 
hinder violations of its airspace by China has increased 
drastically since 2010. Whereas in fiscal year 2009 a 
mere 38 such missions were flown, in fiscal year 2013 
the number rose to 415.13 In addition, the Japanese 
coast guard reported 188 cases in 2013 in which 
Chinese vessels had intruded into Japan’s territorial 
waters. In 2009 not one such incident had occurred 
(see Fig. 1).14 Due to the intensified presence of China 
in the island area, Tokyo’s government officials have 
warned against unintentional incidents that could 
lead to further escalation. In May 2014, for example, 
military aircraft from the two sides flying over the East 
China Sea passed each other at a distance of only 30 
meters – a dangerous situation for which Japan and 
China each held the other accountable.15 
Yet it is not only China’s growing presence that 
causes concern; its aggressive actions are also particu-
larly alarming. For example, an incident in January 
2013, in which according to Japanese statements a 
Chinese navy vessel trained fire-control radar on a Japa-
nese destroyer, caused a great stir. Japan’s defense 
minister at the time, Itsunori Onedera, declared that
13  Heisei 25 Nendo no Kinkyū Hasshin jishi jōkyō ni tsuite [On the 
scrambles carried out in fiscal year 2013], ed. Japan Ministry 
of Defense, 9 April 2014, 3, http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/ 
press2014/press_pdf/p20140409.pdf (accessed 13 May 2014). 
The Japan Ministry of Defense calculates number of missions 
per fiscal year. 
14  Senkakushotō shūhen kaiiki ni okeru chūgoku kōsentō no dōkō 
to wa ga kuni no taisho [The activities of official Chinese vessels 
and similar ships in the waters around the Senkaku Islands 
and the countermeasures taken by our country], ed. Japan 
Coast Guard, July 2014, http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/senkaku/ 
index.html (accessed 13 August 2014). 
15  “Beijing Defends Scrambling of Fighters against SDF Air-
craft in East China”, Asahi Shimbun, 26 May 2014, http://ajw. 
asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201405260051 
(accessed 27 May 2014). 
SWP Berlin 
Japan’s Security Policy:  
A Shift in Direction under Abe? 
March 2015 
 
 
8 
  
Potential for Conflict with China 
Fig. 1 
Number of Chinese vessels in Japanese maritime areas around the Senkaku Islands since 2009 
Source: Japan Ministry of Defense, <www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/senkaku/index.html>. 
 
China’s behavior could be considered a “threat of 
military force” under the United Nations Charter.16 
According to Japanese reports, a similar event may 
have occurred in May 2014.17 Japan was also outraged 
when Beijing established an Air Defense Identification 
Zone (ADIZ) encompassing large swathes of the East 
China Sea, including the disputed island region, in 
November 2013. Beijing announced it would require 
all aircraft flying within this zone to submit flight 
plans to Chinese authorities in advance. 
Potential for Conflict with China 
According to Japanese security experts, China is em-
ploying a “salami tactic” (salami senjutsu), meaning 
that Beijing routinely seeks pretexts to successively 
expand and consolidate its control over the disputed 
16  “China’s Dangerous Conduct”, Japan Times, 8 February 
2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/02/08/ 
editorials/chinas-dangerous-conduct/#.U9jyIxAviaM (accessed 
14 April 2014). 
17  “Japan Says Chinese Warship Could Have ‘Locked’ on SDF 
Vessel, Patrol Plane”, Asahi Shimbun, 14 June 2014, http://ajw. 
asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201406140031 
(accessed 14 June 2014). 
territories and surrounding maritime areas.18 
Japanese observers draw a parallel to China’s actions 
in the territorial disputes over islands in the South 
China Sea.19 China has ostensibly been applying its 
step-by-step method in conscious avoidance of 
committing explicitly belligerent acts. Tokyo views 
these activities as “gray zone conflicts” on the 
borderline between peace and war. Japanese govern-
ment officials believe one future scenario could 
involve Chinese special forces landing on the islands 
disguised as fishermen.20 Tokyo wants to avoid 
yielding to Beijing in the island dispute at all costs; 
China could perceive concessions as an affirmation of 
its salami tactic and be prompted to apply it even 
more resolutely. 
18  “‘Seiji no genba’ nicchū reisen: minami-shina-kai muhōna 
kakuchō” [‘Political practice’ Cold war between Japan and 
China: Ruthless expansion in the South China Sea], Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 12 February 2014. 
19  See also: Gerhard Will, Tough Crossing: Europa und die Kon-
flikte in der Südchinesischen See [Tough crossing: Europe and the 
conflicts in the South China Sea], SWP Research Paper 10/ 
2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2014). 
20  “Gree zōn jitai, jikō de taisho ni mizo. Kyōgi nankō ka” 
[Gray-zone cases, LDP and Komeito divided on how to 
respond. Consultations proceeding haltingly], Asahi Shimbun, 
19 May 2014. Russia’s actions in Ukraine are also discussed 
as an example of a gray-zone conflict. 
 
In Japanese contiguous zone  
(up to 24 nautical miles from  
the Japanese coastline) 
In Japanese territorial waters 
(maritime areas up to 12 nautical 
miles from the Japanese coastline) 
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The Security Environment 
Due to the nuclear deterrence provided by its ally, 
the US, Japanese defense ministry officials consider 
a Sino-Japanese war unlikely,21 though they add that 
the current security situation is characterized by a 
“stability-instability paradox” and that the possibility 
of an armed conflict limited to the Senkaku Islands 
cannot be excluded.22 Paradoxically, mutual deter-
rence at the level of nuclear weapons can give rise to 
instability at a lower level of escalation. Should the 
leadership in Beijing come to the conclusion that 
Washington is firmly committed to avoiding a war 
with China and can therefore be expected to act with 
restraint, they may be tempted to acquire control over 
the disputed islands by conventional military means. 
Particularly troubling for Tokyo in this context is the 
fact that the Senkaku Islands, as well as the surround-
ing islands, are nearly impossible to protect as they 
are too small to accommodate the stationing of any 
sizeable air-defense systems.23 Japanese strategists are 
also disquieted by China’s asymmetrical capabilities, 
including anti-ship missiles and submarines, which 
enable Beijing to disrupt US power projection into 
the western Pacific (anti-access/area-denial strategies).24 
Japanese observers do not anticipate an improvement 
in bilateral relations with China, for two reasons. First, 
for the foreseeable future the balance of power will 
continue to shift in favor of the Chinese side, so that 
Beijing’s willingness to make concessions vis-à-vis a 
stagnating Japan is likely to be circumscribed.25 
21  National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, ed. 
Japan Ministry of Defense, 17 December 2013, http://www. 
mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_ 
e2.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014). Hereafter abbreviated as 
NDPG 2013. 
22  Sugio Takahashi, “Kakuheiki o meguru shomondai to 
Nihon anzen hoshō: NPR Shin START taisei, ‘kakuheiki no nai 
sekai’, kakudai yokushi” [Various problems regarding nuclear 
weapons and Japan’s security – NPR and new START system, 
‘world without nuclear weapons’, extended deterrence], 
Kaigai jijō 58, no. 7/8 (2010): 30–51. 
23  Daisaku Sakaguchi, “Aratana Bōei Senryaku no Sōzō 
Nansei Chiiki ni okeru Sekkyokuteki Eashii Batoru no shinajii 
kōka” [Creating a new defense strategy: Synergy effects of 
active defense and air-sea battle in the Southwest Region], 
Kokusai anzen hoshō, 39, no. 3 (2011): 3–13 (3). 
24  Satoru Fuse, “Taichū akusesu kyohi senryaku – aratana 
taichū bōei senryaku no arikata o mezashite” [Anti-access 
strategy vis-à-vis China – the search for a new defense strategy 
vis-à-vis China], Kokusai anzen hoshō 39, no. 3 (2011): 63–73. 
25  NIDS China Security Report 2013, ed. National Institute for 
Defense Studies (Tokyo, January 2014), 3, http://www.nids.go. 
jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2013_ 
A01.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014). 
Second, China’s leadership under head of state and 
party leader Xi Jinping has been capitalizing on anti-
Japanese nationalism to win popular support for its 
intransigent foreign policy toward the former occu-
pier and to simultaneously divert attention from 
domestic problems like political corruption, environ-
mental degradation, or a slow-down in economic 
growth.26 
North Korea’s Missile and Nuclear Programs 
Japanese observers see a further security threat in 
the advancement of North Korea’s missile and nuclear 
technology. Over the past several years the regime in 
Pyongyang has managed to increase the range and 
precision of its ballistic missiles in successive tests, a 
development which is not lost on the Japanese govern-
ment.27 In addition, the defense ministry in Tokyo does 
not rule out the possibility that North Korea, follow-
ing its third nuclear test in February 2013, has devel-
oped nuclear warheads small enough to arm ballistic 
missiles.28 Ever since North Korean intelligence agents 
kidnapped Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s in 
order to employ them to train North Korean spies and 
agents in Japanese culture and language, the Japanese 
have come to view North Korea predominantly as an 
unpredictable and insidious neighbor. A number of 
assumed kidnappings remain unresolved due to a lack 
of cooperation on the part of Pyongyang. 
Japanese security experts are convinced that North 
Korea’s leadership is unlikely to deploy missiles, let 
alone nuclear weapons, against Japan or South Korea 
due to the fear of an annihilating retaliation.29 Pyong-
yang could, however, attempt to use the threat of 
attacks to blackmail Japan.30 As security experts point 
out, the torpedo attack on the South Korean warship 
“Cheonan” in March 2010 and the artillery attack on 
the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong in November 
26  East Asian Strategic Review 2014, ed. National Institute for 
Defense Studies, 3, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/ 
east-asian/pdf/2014/east-asian_e2014_introduction.pdf 
(accessed 15 July 2014). 
27  NDPG 2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 3. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Narushige Michishita, “N. Korean Nuke Test Increases 
Threat Level”, Asahi Shimbun, 14 February 2013, http://ajw. 
asahi.com/article/views/AJ201302140040 (accessed 17 Feb-
ruary 2013). 
30  Patrick M. Cronin, “Time to Actively Deter North Korea”, 
The Diplomat, 25 June 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/ 
time-to-actively-deter-north-korea/ (accessed 27 June 2014). 
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Ambivalence toward Russia 
2010 demonstrate that the regime does not shy away 
from military provocations. Japanese observers even 
consider the deployment of missiles and nuclear weap-
ons possible. Should the North Korean regime threaten 
to collapse and the young, inexperienced leader Kim 
Jong-Un assesses the situation as hopeless, he could in 
desperation order the deployment of such weapons.31 
Ambivalence toward Russia 
Russia is perceived ambivalently in Japan. Although 
surveys show that since the end of the Cold War fewer 
and fewer Japanese consider Moscow a military threat, 
Russia’s annexation of the five islands of the Kuril 
Archipelago toward the end of World War II continues 
to put a strain on relations between the two coun-
tries.32 The ongoing territorial dispute has to this day 
prevented the signing of a peace treaty. As Japanese 
security experts observe, Russia has been expanding 
its military presence on the islands since 2011.33 The 
activities of military detachments there continue 
to put Japan’s armed forces on alert with increasing 
frequency. According to the defense ministry, Japa-
nese interceptors were deployed 359 times in fiscal 
year 2013 because Russian aircraft threatened to 
violate the country’s airspace.34 
Still, Russia’s show of force around the Kuril Islands 
are not assessed in Japan as an immediate military 
threat but rather as an attempt to extract political or 
military concessions from Tokyo, for example in nego-
tiations over the Kuril issue itself.35 Moreover, Japa-
nese strategists are aware that the maneuvers are not 
only aimed at Japan but also designed to impress an 
ascending China. In recent years the potential military 
threat posed by China has become a subject of open 
debate in Russia, a trend monitored very closely in 
31  Michishita, “N. Korean Nuke Test” (see note 29). 
32  Akio Kawato, “How Russia Matters in Japan-US Alliance”, 
in The US-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism, ed. 
Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry and Yoichiro Sato (New 
York, 2011): 177–93 (179). 
33  Defense of Japan 2012, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense, 54, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2012.html (accessed 
3 May 2014). 
34  Heisei 25 Nendo no Kinkyū Hasshin jishi jōkyō ni tsuite, ed. Japan 
Ministry of Defense (see note 13), 3. 
35  See also: Margarete Klein, Russland als euro-pazifische Macht: 
Ziele, Strategien und Perspektiven russischer Ostasienpolitik [Russia 
as a Euro-Pacific power: Objectives, strategies and prospects 
of Russia’s East Asia policy], SWP Research Paper 12/2014 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2014), 13. 
Japan.36 In light of this development, some Japanese 
observers hope for closer cooperation with Moscow, 
which could serve as a counterbalance to China. Others, 
on the other hand, consider this hope overly optimis-
tic, since Moscow is likely to continue pursuing co-
operation with Beijing.37 The latter cite the Ukraine 
crisis as validating this view, in the course of which 
Russia has responded to Western sanctions by aligning 
itself more closely with China in economic, military 
and geostrategic terms. 
 
 
36  East Asian Strategic Review 2014, ed. National Institute 
for Defense Studies (see note 26), 231. 
37  East Asian Strategic Review 2013, ed. National Institute 
for Defense Studies, 271, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/ 
publication/east-asian/pdf/2013/east-asian_e2013_07.pdf 
(accessed 3 May 2014). 
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The Establishment of a National Security Council 
The Establishment of a National Security Council 
 
Faced with the security challenges in Japan’s regional 
environment, the Abe administration founded a Na-
tional Security Council (NSC) with its own Secretariat 
in December 2013.38 By conducting regular consulta-
tions in the small circle of experts in the NSC, the 
Prime Minister aims to gain more influence over the 
country’s strategy.39 The institution is modeled after 
the US National Security Council, which plays a 
leading role in shaping and implementing US foreign 
policy. But the Japanese NSC is unlikely to attain a 
level of significance comparable to that of its US coun-
terpart in terms of developing foreign policy strategy. 
On the other hand, it is apparent that Japan is making 
use of its new National Security Secretariat to inten-
sify security policy cooperation with the US and other 
countries. 
The Role of the NSC in Strategy Development 
In the past it was primarily the elite ministerial bu-
reaucracy and less the prime minister and his cabinet 
who determined the orientation of Japan’s foreign 
policy. But under this arrangement there was a lack 
of inter-ministerial strategic planning and coopera-
tion between the foreign ministry and the ministry 
of defense.40 In future the NSC is expected to provide 
the political leadership with the means to improve 
its mid- to long-range planning.41 
38  Remarks made by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the Lower 
House, 25 October 2013, see http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp (accessed 
4 May 2013). 
39  “Nihon ban NSC (Kokka anzen hoshō kaigi) no gaiyō to 
kadai: Nihon ban NSC kōsō, beiei tono hikaku, kadai o chūshin 
ni” [Form and function of the Japanese NSC (National Secu-
rity Council): Concept of the Japanese NSC, central issues in 
comparison with the US und Great Britain, and problems], 
ed. National Diet Library, Issue Brief 801 (October 2013): 4. 
40  Hideyuki Takahashi, “Kokka anzen hoshō senryaku 
sakutei ni fukaketsu na nihon ban NSC setsuritsu ni mukete: 
kokunan no imakoso ōdanteki ishi kettei shisutemu kaku-
ritsu o” [On the foundation of the NSC, which is essential for 
the Security Strategy: Especially now, in times of crisis, it is 
necessary to establish a comprehensive decision-making sys-
tem], Kokusai anzen hoshō, 39, no. 3 (2011): 14–27 (14f.). 
41  Starting in the mid-1990s, administrative reforms strength-
ened the role of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, above all 
The precursor to the NSC was the “Security Council 
of Japan”, a body consisting of nine ministers and 
tasked with providing advice on security challenges, 
defense plans and crisis response. But the Security 
Council was regarded as ineffective due to the relative-
ly large number of participants, which is why it was 
often not convoked for several months at a time.42 The 
idea of introducing an NSC with only a few members 
was discussed in governmental circles during Abe’s 
first premiership 2006/2007, but a law to this effect 
was not drafted until Abe’s second term of office.43 
Like the US model, the new NSC comprises four 
members of the government who meet fortnightly: 
the Prime Minister as chairman, the Chief Cabinet Sec-
retary,44 the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minis-
ter. The consultations conducted in the old Security 
Council of nine ministers continue to be held in order 
to discuss policy documents such as the National De-
fense Policy Guidelines or international deployments 
of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), Japan’s military. In 
crisis situations the Prime Minister can also convene 
sessions with the respective experts. The newly estab-
lished National Security Secretariat assists with devis-
ing security strategy at all these meetings. Around 
sixty security policy experts from various ministries, 
such as the foreign ministry and the defense ministry, 
are seconded to the body for a limited time.45 Abe has 
entrusted the chairmanship of the Secretariat to his 
in crisis situations such as an earthquake catastrophe. See 
Alexandra Sakaki and Kerstin Lukner, “Japan’s Crisis Man-
agement amid Growing Complexity: In Search of New Ap-
proaches”, Japanese Journal of Political Science 14, no. 2 (2013): 
155–76 (160ff.). 
42  Satoshi Morimoto, Nihon Bōei saikōron [Revisiting Japanese 
defense policy], (Tokyo, 2008), 237. 
43  “Nihon ban NSC no gaiyō to kadai”, ed. National Diet 
Library (see note 39): 2. 
44  The Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary has the status of 
a cabinet member. He not only plays an important role in 
making policy – through coordination and mediation among 
various government agencies –; he is also the government’s 
principle spokesperson. 
45  Yuriko Koike, “Securing Japan”, Project Syndicate, 31 Octo-
ber 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/yuriko-koike-
on-japan-s-new-national-security-council (accessed 27 May 
2013). 
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The National Security Secretariat as a Vehicle for Security Policy Dialogue 
former Deputy Foreign Minister and National Security 
Adviser, Shotaro Yachi. 
Although the regular sessions provide the four 
government members with an opportunity to discuss 
challenges and priorities as well as to coordinate 
policies within the intimate circle of the country’s 
senior political cadre, the ministries will undoubtedly 
continue to have a say in policy-making in the future. 
As in previous reform attempts, the ministerial bureau-
cracy will presumably contest any changes which 
would result in a loss of influence to the Cabinet.46 
As the staff of the National Security Secretariat is com-
prised of officials who are dispatched from their minis-
tries only temporarily, their loyalties toward the “home 
ministries” are likely to remain intact. In this way in-
ter-ministerial rivalries are carried over into the Secre-
tariat, thus rendering inter-agency planning difficult. 
Furthermore, cabinet reshuffles, which occur more 
than once a year on average, can also be expected to 
hinder strategic deliberations in the NSC. The Prime 
Minister uses such shake-ups to secure the support of 
rival factions within parties by allocating government 
posts.47 Thus, the composition of the NSC can be ex-
pected to fluctuate substantially. New members must 
first become acquainted with the work of the Council, 
and their ideas and views may differ substantially 
from those of their predecessors. As a result, planning 
that has already been set in motion may come to a 
standstill. 
Moreover, the discretionary power of the NSC is 
limited by the fact that the Japanese prime minister 
does not dispose of the wide-ranging authority of the 
president of the United States.48 Decisions taken in 
the National Security Council become legally binding 
only once they have been unanimously accepted by 
the entire Cabinet.49 As long as Cabinet members can 
influence or prevent NSC planning by means of a 
veto, the discussion and decision process is unlikely 
to become more efficient. 
46  Sakaki and Lukner, “Japan’s Crisis Management amid 
Growing Complexity” (see note 41), 160f 
47  Since 2000 there have been 27 cabinets in Japan. See 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidainaikaku/index.html 
(accessed 20 October 2014). The major Japanese parties, LDP 
and DPJ, are split into rivaling internal factions (or groups). 
These are based largely on loyalties or patronage and play 
an important role in inner-party power struggles. 
48  “Nihon ban NSC no gaiyō to kadai”, ed. National Diet 
Library (see note 39), 7. 
49  Ibid., 12. 
The National Security Secretariat as a 
Vehicle for Security Policy Dialogue 
It remains to be seen how effective the new institu-
tions are in terms of strategy development, but it is 
already becoming apparent that Japan is using the 
National Security Secretariat to intensify the security 
dialogue not only with the US but also with other 
partners. The Secretary General of the Secretariat, 
Shotaro Yachi, traveled to the US immediately after 
assuming office in January 2014, where he held talks 
with National Security Adviser Susan Rice, Secretary 
of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck 
Hagel.50 The Japanese government also announced 
that Yachi would be meeting with government offi-
cials in the UK, Germany, Belgium, France, India and 
Russia.51 All that is known about these talks is that the 
security situation in East Asia was among the issues 
to be discussed.52 In addition, the US and the UK have 
agreed to establish a security hotline between Yachi 
and their respective national security advisers to facili-
tate the swift and secure exchange of confidential in-
formation around the clock in emergency situations.53 
Japan is also exploring the establishment of hotlines 
with Australia, France, Germany, India, South Korea 
and Russia.54 
Unlike Japanese Cabinet members Yachi is not re-
quired to be present at the frequent sessions of parlia-
ment due to his position. This gives him more schedul-
ing flexibility and frees him to undertake extended 
trips abroad. His considerable independence allows 
him to engage in spontaneous and intimate personal 
exchange with government officials in other coun-
50  J. Berkshire Miller, “How Will Japan’s New NSC Work?”, 
The Diplomat, 29 January 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/ 
01/how-will-japans-new-nsc-work/ (accessed 15 May 2014). 
51  Ibid. 
52  “Japan, U.S. Security Advisers Agree on Closer Bilateral 
Cooperation”, Japan Times, 18 January 2014, http://www. 
japantimes. co.jp/news/2014/01/18/national/politics-diplomacy/ 
japan-u-s-security-advisers-agree-on-closer-bilateral-cooperation/ 
(accessed 22 January 2014). 
53  “Japan to Set Up National Security Hotline with Britain”, 
Asahi Shimbun, 24 October 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/ 
behind_news/politics/AJ201310240072 (accessed 20 May 
2013). Zur Rolle von Hotlines siehe auch: Euan Graham, 
“Maritime Hotlines in East Asia”, S. Rajaratnam School of Inter-
national Studies Policy Brief, May 2014, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/07/RSIS_RFQ_Maritime-Hotlines-in-
East-Asia_160514_Web.pdf (accessed 29 October 2014). 
54  “For Japan’s New Security Council, It’s All about Commu-
nication”, Nikkei Asian Review, 3 December 2013, http://asia. 
nikkei.com/print/article/7592 (accessed 27 May 2014). 
SWP Berlin 
Japan’s Security Policy:  
A Shift in Direction under Abe? 
March 2015 
 
 
13 
 
 
The Establishment of a National Security Council 
tries.55 As the representative of an institution that is 
analogous to the US National Security Council, Yachi 
can meet with Security Adviser Susan Rice on equal 
footing and thus strengthen direct communication 
with the National Security Council in Washington. 
Since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, the US 
National Security Council has played an increasingly 
important role in planning and implementing foreign 
policy. Japan’s institutional changes in the domain of 
security policy, which open a new channel of commu-
nication with the White House, can also be seen as a 
reaction to US policy.56 
Intelligence-Sharing 
In conjunction with the creation of the NSC, on 6 De-
cember 2013 the Japanese parliament adopted a con-
tentious law stiffening penalties for breaches of state 
secrecy. Prime Minister Abe called the law a necessary 
precondition for intensifying intelligence exchange 
with other countries and explained that it gave the 
NSC access to a wealth of data that could serve him as 
a basis for discussions and decisions.57 Abe cited his 
administration’s plans to expand intelligence coopera-
tion with the US and the UK as one example of this 
intensified exchange.58 
Before the change in legislation, the penalties for 
disclosing sensitive information were relatively mild 
compared with those in other countries. For example, 
government officials who passed on secret informa-
tion faced a maximum prison sentence of one year.59 
Under the new law, by contrast, leaking state secrets is 
55  Alexandra Sakaki, “Japan und die EU: Enttäuschte Erwar-
tungen”[Japan and the EU: Unfulfilled expectations], in Die EU 
im Beziehungsgefüge großer Staaten: Komplex – kooperativ – krisen-
haft [The EU in the relational framework of major players: 
Complex – cooperative – crisis-ridden], ed. Kai-Olaf Lang and 
Gudrun Wacker, SWP Research Paper 25/2013 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2013): 53–64 (58). 
56  Kurt Campbell, “Watch the Rise of Asia’s National Security 
Councils”, Financial Times, 9 January 2014, http://blogs.ft.com/ 
the-a-list/2014/01/09/watch-the-rise-of-asias-national-security-
councils/ (accessed 10 April 2014). 
57  “Anzen kaigi, kadai nokoshi shidō he, jōhō no atsukai, 
gijiroku sakusei ‘himitsu hogo hō to ittai’ mujun mo” [Secu-
rity Council begins work despite unresolved problems, treat-
ment of information and keeping of official minutes partially 
inconsistent with corresponding secrecy law], Asahi Shimbun, 
28 November 2013. 
58  Remarks made by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the Lower 
House, 25 October 2013 (see note 38). 
59  Morimoto, Nihon Bōei saikōron (see note 42). 
punishable by up to ten years in prison and a fine. 
Moreover, the government can classify information 
related to diplomacy, defense, espionage and the fight 
against terror as state secrets for a period of up to sixty 
years. Critics argue that the law restricts freedom of 
the press and freedom of information and can be used 
to cover up government abuses and intimidate the 
opposition.60 
In passing the new law, Tokyo seems to have re-
sponded to pressure from the US. The US feared that 
Japan’s formerly mild penalties for breaches of secrecy 
were unlikely to discourage the negligent handling of 
classified information61 – which explains why Washing-
ton has been so reluctant to share technical details on 
the F-35 stealth fighters that Japan’s air force is sched-
uled to acquire in 2017.62 Accordingly, in October 
2013 the US expressed satisfaction over Japan’s efforts 
to enact new legislation.63 
In Japan, too, there had been calls in recent years 
for a tougher secrecy law. Above all, the lack of data 
exchange among government agencies was criticized. 
Instead of reporting their information to a central 
intelligence authority, each Japanese ministry main-
tains its own office to collect and analyze relevant 
data.64 The individual authorities withhold intelli-
gence, partly because they distrust each other and 
want to claim successes for themselves.65 The new law 
is designed to promote administrative information 
exchange, thereby providing the NSC with a better 
60  “NSC secchi hōan to tokutei himitsu hogo hōan” [Draft 
bills on the establishment of the NSC and state secrecy], NHK, 
23 October 2013, http://www.nhk.or.jp/kaisetsu-blog/100/ 
170936.html (accessed 15 May 2014). 
61  “Tokutei himitsu hogo hōan wa ‘nichibei dōmei no kyōka’ 
no tame ni tsukurareru?” [Is the state secrecy law being drafted 
to strengthen the Japanese-US alliance?], The Huffington Post 
Japan, 4 October 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.jp/2013/ 
10/04/japan-nsc_n_4041820.html (accessed 26 May 2014). 
62  “Himitsu hogo hōan dōmei koku to kimitsu kyōyū he NSC 
hōan to setto” [Draft secrecy bill: Exchange of classified infor-
mation among allied countries, together with NSC draft bill], 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 27 January 2013. 
63  Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida, Minister of Defense 
Onodera, Secretary of State Kerry, Secretary of Defense Hagel, 
Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Toward a More 
Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities, 3 October 2013, 
5, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/JointStatement2013.pdf 
(accessed 20 May 2014). 
64  Morimoto, Nihon Bōei saikōron (see note 42), 240ff. 
65  “Himitsu hogo hō, naze hitsuyō? NSC unyō he, taisei o 
seibi” [Why is the secrecy law necessary? Towards the use 
of the NSC, adaptation of the organization], Sankei News, 
6 December 2013, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/ 
131206/plc13120609450006-n2.htm (accessed 26 May 2014). 
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Intelligence-Sharing 
basis for making decisions. In order to achieve this, a 
department has been established within the National 
Security Secretariat that gathers intelligence centrally, 
evaluates it and submits it to the Prime Minister and 
his Cabinet. 
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“Proactive Pacifism” as a New Leitmotif: 
Departure from Former Policy? 
 
Two publications from December 2013 provide insight 
into the direction Tokyo’s security policy has taken 
under the Abe administration: The National Security 
Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program 
Guidelines (NDPG). Both documents outline how 
the government intends to protect the country from 
threats and enhance regional and international sta-
bility. The most salient innovation in the strategy 
documents is the leitmotif of “proactive pacifism”. By 
promoting this concept the Prime Minister explicitly 
rejects the idealistic pacifist notions of the post-war 
era and thus justifies what he considers to be a nec-
essary easing of military constraints. Abe intends to 
create better conditions for security cooperation with 
other countries and bolster Japan’s ability to influence 
regional developments. For the most part, however, 
his reforms serve merely to align existing guidelines 
with reality and legitimize what the Japanese govern-
ment already practices. 
The Security Strategy adopted by the NSC and the 
Cabinet introduced binding rules for all agencies for 
the first time ever. The strategy document is intended 
to cover a ten-year period. Should there be a “signify-
cant change” in the security environment, however, 
the NSC can decide to revise it sooner.66 Since 1976 the 
Japanese Cabinet has issued National Defense Program 
Guidelines in irregular intervals dealing with the 
defense strategy and the military capabilities neces-
sary to implement it. In the last two revisions of 2004 
and 2010, however, the paper evolved into a strategic 
framework document addressing security relations 
with the US and other countries.67 
Basic Principles 
The strategy documents of December 2013 define the 
guiding principles of national security policy. Accord-
ing to these documents, Japan champions universal 
66  National Security Strategy, ed. Prime Minister of Japan, 
17 December 2013, 2, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/ 
documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf 
(accessed 13 April 2014). Hereafter abbreviated as NSS. 
67  East Asian Strategic Review 2014, ed. National Institute 
for Defense Studies (see note 26), 55. 
values such as democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law.68 Moreover, as a “peace-loving nation”, it is 
committed to maintaining a security policy designed 
exclusively for defense,69 “not becoming a military 
power that poses a threat to other countries”, and 
observing the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”, i.e., 
neither possessing nor producing nuclear weapons 
nor allowing third parties to bring such weapons into 
the country.70 These basic principles are already part 
of the Defense Guidelines of 2010 and are found in 
past White or Blue Books.71 
For the first time, Tokyo has subsumed its security 
policy under a leitmotiv: “proactive pacifism, based on 
the principle of international cooperation”.72 The 
term “sekkyokuteki heiwashugi” – literally “proactive 
pacifism” – is translated as “proactive contributor to 
peace” in official government documents drafted in 
English.73 In subscribing to this concept, Japan wants 
to work with other nations to actively contribute to 
international security instead of merely reacting to 
events as it has done in the past.74 According to the 
National Security Strategy, the increasingly difficult 
security environment with its complex challenges 
requires international policy coordination; further-
more, the only way the country can effectively pursue 
its national interests – such as defending its sovereign-
ty and increasing its prosperity – is through coopera-
tion with the international community.75 Although 
previous strategy documents have called for Japanese 
contributions to international peace, for example in 
the form of international peace-keeping missions, 
humanitarian aid or disaster relief, the guiding idea of 
a “proactive pacifism” is new in the country’s security 
policy. 
68  NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 2. 
69  Ibid., 3. 
70  Ibid., 3; NDPG 2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense 
(see note 21), 6. 
71  The Blue Book is a report on Japan’s foreign policy 
published annually by the foreign ministry. 
72  NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 1; NDPG 
2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 5. 
73  Literally translated as “proactive pacifism” by the author. 
74  NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 15. 
75  Ibid., 3. 
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Abe’s Proactive Pacifism Approach: An Alternative to the Yoshida Doctrine 
Nevertheless, the most recent strategy papers reveal 
little about the policy implications of the concept. Like 
previous papers, the last two papers refer to three cen-
tral pillars of Japanese security policy: (1) Japan’s own 
capabilities and defense measures, (2) the alliance 
with the US, and (3) cooperation with other countries. 
The measures proposed in these three areas do not 
constitute any substantial change in Japan’s foreign 
policy (see next chapter). 
Abe’s Proactive Pacifism Approach: 
An Alternative to the Yoshida Doctrine 
There is consensus among Japanese observers that 
the term “proactive pacifism” stands for Abe’s goal of 
establishing Japan as a “normal” power that does not 
reject the use of military force categorically.76 The 
term has apparently been chosen in order to generate 
acceptance in the population, which is extremely 
skeptical about military missions.77 In his speeches 
Abe likes to cite Japan’s non-military involvement in 
international crises and catastrophes as examples of 
“proactive pacifism” – such as the emergency assis-
tance after the “Haiyan” typhoon in the Philippines in 
2013.78 At the same time, however, he has called for 
relaxing the military restrictions Japan has imposed 
on itself with its “Peace Constitution”,79 a move he 
considers necessary to enable Japan to work together 
with partners and make a greater contribution to 
international stability. 
According to Article 9 of the Constitution of 1946, 
the people of Japan renounced not only their right 
to wage war but also the right to maintain a standing 
army. Nevertheless, one year after the Korean War 
(1950–1953) Japan’s Self Defense Forces were created. 
Tokyo argued at the time that the Constitution 
76  “Sekkyokuteki ‘heiwashugi’ no shōtai wa?” [What is the 
true face of ‘proactive pacifism’?], Asahi Shimbun, 30 May 2014; 
Shinichi Kitaoka, “Sekkyokuteki heiwashugi’ ga kannyō” [The 
relevance of ‘proactive pacifism’], Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 Novem-
ber 2013. 
77  “Shushō no iu ‘Sekkyoku heiwashugi’ tte?” [What actually 
is Prime Minister Abe’s ‘active pacifism’?], Asahi Shimbun, 15 
January 2014. 
78  Shinzo Abe, Speech in the Lower House, 26 March 2014, 
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp (accessed 10 June 2014). 
79  Shinzo Abe, Remarks by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the 
Occasion of Accepting Hudson Institute’s 2013 Herman Kahn Award, 
25 September 2013, The Pierre Hotel, New York City, http:// 
japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/25hudsone.html 
(accessed 2 June 2014). 
allowed the defense of Japanese territory (individual 
self-defense).80 By contrast, Japan was not permitted 
to support any other country that had been attacked 
(collective self-defense). For a long time Japan deftly 
sidestepped US calls for military contributions. The 
country stayed out of international conflicts under a 
policy stipulated by the “Yoshida Doctrine”. The doc-
trine is named after Shigeru Yoshida, who served as 
prime minister in 1946/1947 and from 1948 to 1954 
and who significantly shaped Tokyo’s foreign policy. 
By exercising self-restraint in security policy matters, 
Japan hoped to regain trust internationally and con-
centrate on rebuilding its economy. With this in mind, 
the country introduced more rigid guidelines for 
weapons exports (1967) and committed itself to the 
“Three Non-Nuclear Principles” (1967). Additionally, 
defense spending was capped at one percent of gross 
national product (1976). 
Abe’s concept of “proactive pacifism” is based on a 
counter-proposal to the Yoshida Doctrine put forth in 
2009 by Kenichi Ito, President of the Japan Forum on 
International Relations, a think tank.81 Ito argued that 
passive pacifism under the Yoshida Doctrine had re-
duced Japan’s security and defense policy to a negative 
list that with respect to the use of military force con-
sisted of only renunciation and prohibition, and that 
strategic debate over Japan’s international policy goals 
and the expansion of its defense capabilities had been 
stifled.82 Ito therefore believed that the time had come 
for Japan to define clearly what foreign policy tools 
were necessary to achieve its own goals. Like Ito, Abe’s 
close advisors criticize the previous security policy.83 
According to Shinichi Kitaoka, President of the Inter-
national University of Japan, China’s military build-up 
80  Cf. Markus Tidten, Japans Militär. Neuer Auftrag und alte 
Grenzen? [Japan’s military. New mandate, old limitations?], 
SWP Research Paper 23/2003 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, June 2003), 7. 
81  Akiko Fukushima, Japan’s “Proactive Contribution to Peace” a 
Mere Political Label?, 19 June 2014, http://www.tokyofoundation. 
org/en/articles/2014/japans-proactive-contribution-to-peace 
(accessed 24 June 2014). 
82  Sekkyokuteki heiwashugi to nichibei dōmei no arikata [Proactive 
pacifism and the guiding principles of the Japanese-US alliance], 
ed. Japan Forum on International Relations, October 2009, 7, 
http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/pr/pdf/32.pdf (accessed 14 May 
2014). 
83  “Sekkyokuteki ‘heiwashugi’ ga kannyō Kitaoka Shinichi-
shi” (see note 76); Shotaro Yachi, “‘More Proactive Contribution 
to Peace’ Changes Japan’s Diplomacy. Abe Administration’s 
Policy Toward Asia and the United States”, Diplomacy, 20 
(April 2014), http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/archives/ 
diplomacy/pt20140412012137.html (accessed 15 April 2014). 
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and North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons pro-
gram demonstrate the failure of passive pacifism.84 
Under the banner of “proactive pacifism”, the Abe 
administration has lifted self-imposed restrictions in 
three areas by (1) reinterpreting Article 9 of the Con-
stitution, (2) changing arms export rules, and (3) revis-
ing the Official Development Assistance Charter. It 
should be noted, though, that Abe’s initiatives merely 
serve to accelerate a “normalization process” in Japa-
nese security policy that has been observable for years. 
The government is legitimizing a less restrictive ap-
proach to military force that has long become accepted 
practice. 
The New Interpretation of Article 9 
Abe was unlikely to achieve the majorities necessary 
to fundamentally amend the Constitution, neither in 
parliament nor by referendum. He therefore limited 
himself to reinterpreting Article 9.85 After fierce debate, 
the LDP and their coalition partner, the Komeito, 
agreed on such an interpretation on 1 July 2014. Under 
the agreement, Tokyo can take military action within 
the framework of collective self-defense if armed ag-
gression is directed against a country with close ties 
to Japan resulting in a threat to Japan’s existence and 
the right of its citizens to life, freedom and the pursuit 
of happiness.86 In this interpretation, collective self-
defense is thus permissible if a concrete threat exists 
for Japan and its citizens. 
Abe cited warding off an attack on a US vessel evacu-
ating Japanese civilians from a crisis region or inter-
cepting North Korean missiles fired at US troops sta-
tioned on the Pacific island of Guam and traveling 
84  Shinichi Kitaoka, “The Turnabout of Japan’s Security Policy: 
Toward ‘Proactive Pacifism’”, Nippon.com, 2 April 2014, http:// 
www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/ (accessed 20 May 2014). 
85  Abe was accused of using a Cabinet decision to circum-
vent the formal procedure of a constitutional amendment, 
thereby undermining Japan’s democratic principles. 
86  Zum Kabinettsbeschluss zu Maßnahmen für die Gesetzgebung über 
die Sicherheit vom 1.7.2014 [On the Cabinet decision of 1 July 2014 
regarding security legislation measures], ed. Botschaft von 
Japan in Deutschland [Embassy of Japan in Germany], http:// 
www.de.emb-japan.go.jp/aktuelles/140701 kabinettsbeschluss. 
html (accessed 4 July 2014). Two further criteria for exercis-
ing the right of collective self-defense are (1) that there are no 
other effective means available to respond to an attack, and 
(2) that the use of weapons be restricted to an absolute mini-
mum. Comparable criteria also apply to the exercise of the 
right of individual self-defense. 
over Japanese territory as hypothetical examples of 
how the armed forces could be deployed.87 At the 
same time, the Premier ruled out the possibility of 
Japanese military operations in a conflict like the Iraq 
war led by Washington in 2003.88 
With the Cabinet decision, Japan was responding 
to calls from Washington to support its Asia policy. 
Government officials in Tokyo point out that in a Sino-
Japanese crisis the country can rely on the support of 
its ally only if it is prepared to reciprocate by standing 
up for the security of the US. Otherwise, they warn, 
there is a danger that Washington could refuse Japan 
its support.89 Abe has cited the difficult security en-
vironment as justification for reinterpreting Article 9, 
emphasizing that the new reading does not change 
Japan’s status as a pacifist country.90 He further argues 
that partially exercising the right to collective self-
defense in concert with the US increases the deter-
rence potential, thereby reducing the chance of Japan 
becoming involved in a war.91 
The reinterpretation of Article 9 supersedes inter-
pretations in effect since the 1950s, according to which 
Japan conceded itself the right only to individual self-
defense. Some observers view this new interpretation 
as the “greatest change” in Japanese security policy 
since the foundation of the Self-Defense Forces.92 But 
a closer look reveals that the process is little more than 
a symbolic turning point, for in practice rigorous 
rejection of collective self-defense has been increasing-
87  Adam Liff, “Japan’s Article 9 Challenge”, The National Inter-
est, 27 June 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ 
japans-article-9-challenge-10766 (accessed 28 June 2014). 
88  “New Defense Era for Japan: Collective Right OK’d in 
Severe Security Environment”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 1 July 2014, 
http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0001394249 (accessed 
2 July 2014). 
89  Gabriel Domínguez, “Japan’s Security Policy Shift: ‘A Blow 
to Ties with East Asia’. Interview with Jeremy A. Yellen”, 
Deutsche Welle, 1 July 2014, http://www.dw.de/japans-security-
policy-shift-a-blow-to-ties-with-east-asia/a-17748656 (accessed 
14 July 2014). 
90  “Tokushū shūdanteki jieiken, shushō no kisha kaiken 
yōshi ‘kenpō kaishaku no kihon kawarazu’” [Special: Sum-
mary of the press conference of the Prime Minister on the 
right to collective self-defense, ‘The fundamental interpre-
tation of the constitution remains unchanged’], Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, 2 July 2014. 
91  “‘Sensō arienu’ shushō kaiken, nando mo kyōchō” [‘War 
is impossible’, Prime Minister repeatedly emphasizes at press 
conference], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2 July 2014. 
92  “Japan’s Democracy to Be Put to the Test”, Asahi Shimbun, 
2 July 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/ 
AJ201407020038 (accessed 5 July 2014). 
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The Revision of Arms Export Rules 
ly giving way to a more pragmatic approach since 
the 1980s. Tokyo continues to approve more and more 
interaction and integration between its own and 
foreign troops in joint exercises or UN peacekeeping 
missions. The deployment of Japanese troops from 
2001 to 2010 in connection with the war in Afghani-
stan is considered by observers as a de facto exercise 
of the right to collective self-defense.93 Thus, the re-
interpretation of Article 9 is more an evolutionary 
than a revolutionary step in Japan’s defense policy. 
The Cabinet decision to reinterpret Article 9 facili-
tates closer cooperation with Japan’s ally, the US. In 
addition, Abe argues in favor of Japanese troops par-
ticipating in UN peacemaking missions or mine clear-
ance.94 Some in the LDP have proposed supporting 
the Philippines and other countries in their territorial 
disputes with China;95 but coalition partner Komeito 
is strictly opposed to such operations.96 There is also 
disagreement within the LDP regarding the newly 
acquired room for maneuver; the opposition, inciden-
tally, is similarly divided on the issue. In order to 
exercise the right to collective self-defense, Tokyo 
must amend more than ten laws, including the Self-
Defense Forces Act.97 Parliamentary consultations over 
legislative changes could thus take months, if not 
years.98 It is therefore difficult to predict what effects 
Japan’s security policy will have outside its alliance 
with the US. 
Most Japanese continue to reject the use of military 
force. In surveys, over half the population is opposed 
to exercising the right to collective self-defense in cases 
of emergency, while only about a third is in favor.99 Im-
93  Liff, “Japan’s Article 9 Challenge” (see note 87). 
94  “Abe Offers 1st Explanation in Diet, But Many Not Buying 
It”, Asahi Shimbun, 15 July 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/ 
behind_news/politics/AJ201407150054 (accessed 16 July 2014). 
95  “Shūdanteki jieiken – Kōshi yōken, shūsei isogu, jimin, 
kōmei ni hairyo, shūnai gōi no kanōsei” [Right to collective 
self-defense, criteria for application. LDP, in making hasty im-
provements, shows consideration for Komei Party, agreement 
possible by the end of this week], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 22 June 
2014. 
96  “Abe Offers 1st Explanation in Diet, But Many Not Buying 
It” (see note 94). 
97  “Kokkai Ronsen, Shushō, teineina setsumei ishiki” [In par-
liamentary debates, Prime Minister is mindful of well-founded 
argumentation], Yomiuri Shimbun, 15 July 2014. 
98  “Opposition Parties Divided over Collective Self-defense”, 
Mainichi Shimbun, 2 July 2014, http://mainichi.jp/english/ 
english/newsselect/news/20140702p2a00m0na008000c.html 
(accessed 3 July 2014). 
99  “Shūdanteki jieiken – Kōshi yōnin kettei, hantai ga 54%, 
kyōdōtsūshin yoron chōsa” [Opinion poll conducted by Kyodo 
ponderables notwithstanding, Japan’s global military 
involvement is thus unlikely to grow in the future. 
The Revision of Arms Export Rules 
On 1 April 2014 the Abe administration relaxed the 
rules governing arms exports. In future the export 
of such goods is permitted providing it contributes to 
Japan’s security, promotes peace and is in line with 
the principle of “proactive pacifism”.100 Arms exports 
to conflict regions or countries subject to UN sanctions 
continue to be prohibited. The new principles super-
sede the arms export rules introduced in 1967 and 
tightened in 1976, which were tantamount to an ex-
port ban. 
The debate over relaxing or revising the rules is not 
new. Since the 1980s, Japan’s government has gradually 
watered down standards by allowing exceptions to 
the export ban. In 1983 Japan began to deliver defense 
technology to the US. In 2004 Tokyo decided to permit 
the joint development and production of missile defense 
technology in the form of a Japanese-US collaborative 
project.101 The government that preceded the Abe ad-
ministration in the end gave blanket approval to arms 
cooperation with friendly countries in 2011. This step 
paved the way for arms projects with the US, the UK, 
France and Australia.102 For example, Japan is current-
ly developing missile technology with the UK and is col-
laborating with Australia on submarine construc-
tion.103 
news agency: 54 percent against decision to allow the exer-
cise of the right of collective self-defense], Nihon Keizai Shim-
bun, 3 July 2014. 
100  “Buki yushutsu shin gensoku, kakugi kettei, NSC ga 
hatsu no unyōshishin” [Cabinet decision on new weapons ex-
port principles – NSC issues its first implementation guide-
line], Yomiuri Shimbun, 1 April 2014. 
101  Stephanie Nayoung Kang, “Arms Export Control Policies 
in Japan: Revising the ‘Three Principles’ and the Role of the 
Japan-US Security Alliance”, CSIS Issues & Insights 14, no. 12 
(2014): 18–27 (19). 
102  “Japan, France Agree on Development, Exports of Weap-
ons”, Asahi Shimbun, 10 January 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/ 
article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201401100087 (accessed 
14 April 2014). 
103  Paul Kallender-Umezu and Nigel Pittaway, “Japan, Aus-
tralia Deal Poses Tech Issues”, Defense News, 15 June 2014, 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140615/DEFREG03/306
160010/Japan-Australia-Deal-Poses-Tech-Issues (accessed 17 July 
2014); Agence France-Presse, “Japan, Britain to Launch Joint Missile 
Research”, Defense News, 17 July 2014, http://www.defensenews. 
com/article/20140717/DEFREG03/307170036/Japan-Britain-
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“Proactive Pacifism” as a New Leitmotif: Departure from Former Policy? 
The cuts in Japan’s defense budget have led to a 
steady drop in orders for the domestic arms industry. 
Between 2003 and 2014, more than a hundred Japa-
nese companies bowed out of the arms business.104 
The most recent relaxation of export rules is aimed at 
retarding this process. The goal is to sustain Japanese 
arms producers and help them regain their competi-
tiveness through exports and international collabora-
tive projects.105 The revised rules allow Japan to sell 
armaments from multinational projects to third coun-
tries, making it an attractive international collabo-
rative partner. The US government had urged Japan 
to make this change in light of missile technology 
cooperation and in connection with the production 
of the F-35 stealth fighter.106 
Under the new rules, Japan has expanded its arms 
exports in the East Asian region. The government has 
already taken advantage of the new rules; it is cur-
rently negotiating with India over the delivery of US-2 
amphibious airplanes. Japan also hopes to find new 
customers for its arms industry in Southeast Asia.107 
Tokyo has expressed an interest in selling ships, air-
craft and submarines to Indonesia, Vietnam and the 
Philippines.108 The majority of Japan’s citizens, how-
ever, reject such plans. In surveys, only 17 percent 
favor the relaxation of rules proposed by Abe, with 77 
percent opposed.109 
Launch-Joint-Missile-Research (accessed 17 July 2014). 
104  “Buki yushutsu kijun meikaku ni, shin san gensoku, 
kakugi kettei, shishin de hadome” [Cabinet decision on the 
new three principles brings clarity on standard in weapons-
export guidelines], Yomiuri Shimbun, 2 April 2014. 
105  “Sōbi okusai kaihatsu o suishin, bōeishō soan ‘kihon wa 
kokusan’ minaoshi” [Promoting the international deve-
lopment of equipment – the Ministry of Defense plans to 
revise the ‘Basic principle of domestic production’], Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 4 April 2014. 
106  Shannon Dick and Hana Rudolph, “Japan Updates Arms 
Export Policy”, Stimson Spotlight, 24 April 2014, http://www. 
stimson.org/spotlight/japan-updates-arms-export-policy/ 
(accessed 30 April 2014). 
107  “Japan Hopes to Sell Asean on Defense Tech”, Nikkei Asian 
Review, 22 August 2014, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/ 
Policy-Politics/Japan-hopes-to-sell-Asean-on-defense-tech 
(accessed 24 August 2014).  
108  Corey J. Wallace, “Japan’s Strategic Pivot South: Diversi-
fying the Dual Hedge”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 
13, no. 3 (2013): 479–517 (490). 
109  “Shūdanteki jieiken, kōshi yōnin ni hantai 63%, sakunen 
yori zōka” [63% against allowing the exercise of the right of 
collective self-defense, up from previous year], Asahi Shimbun, 
7 April 2014. 
The New Development Cooperation Charter 
On February 10, 2015, the Abe cabinet approved a new 
‘Development Cooperation Charter’ which replaces 
the 2002 Official Development Assistance Charter as a 
guide for Japan’s aid policy for developing nations.110 
The new Charter stipulates for the first time that Japan 
can provide assistance to foreign military forces, al-
though only for ‘nonmilitary purposes’ such as disaster 
relief. Critics argue, however, that it is impossible to 
distinguish military from non-military activities and 
that the government has not established explicit stand-
ards for decision-making.111 Even if Japan’s assistance 
ostensibly serves nonmilitary purposes, it is unclear 
how Tokyo can prevent the aid from being diverted to 
military purposes subsequently.112 
In 2002 the allocation rules had already been 
relaxed to make it easier to support foreign military 
detachments. Whereas the use of development aid 
for military purposes was strictly prohibited under 
the Charter of 1992, the revised version merely recom-
mended avoiding such aid.113 Although Japan con-
tinued to refrain from supporting foreign military 
detachments, it increasingly assisted foreign coast 
guards in the fight against “non-traditional” security 
threats such as piracy or terrorism. In 2006 Tokyo 
transferred three coast guard vessels financed by 
development funds to Indonesia to assist in fighting 
piracy.114 Applying this allocation policy increasingly 
placed Japan in a gray area. In recent years Tokyo has 
supported Southeast Asian countries in building their 
military and paramilitary capabilities vis-à-vis China’s 
military power. Under the new Development Assis-
110  Asahi Shimbun, “Editorial: ‘Development cooperation 
charter’ could transform Japan's foreign policy”, February 11, 
2015, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201502 1 
10030 (accessed February 11, 2015). 
111  Atsushi Hiroshima, “Panel Calls for ODA to Foreign 
Militaries for Nondefense Use”, Asahi Shimbun, 27 June 2014, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ2014062 
70060 (accessed 27 June 2014). 
112  Masaaki Kameda, “Japan adopts new aid policy, may aid 
foreign militaries,” 10 February, 2015, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/10/national/politic
s-diplomacy/japan-adopts-new-aid-policy-may-aid-foreign-
militaries/#.VOyEhWNSmPU (accessed 20 February 2015). 
113  “Govt Mulls Relaxing ODA Ban on Military-related 
Projects”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 27 June 2014, http://the-japan-
news.com/news/article/0001385619 (accessed 29 June 2014). 
114  Atsushi Hiroshima, “Abe Administration Seeks to Revise 
ODA Charter to Assist Militaries”, Asahi Shimbun, 1 April 2014, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ2014040 
10044 (accessed 5 July 2014). 
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Reactions in Japan and Abroad 
tance Charter, Japan is likely to pursue such projects 
more extensively. 
Reactions in Japan and Abroad 
On the whole, Abe’s efforts to relax Japan’s self-
imposed restrictions on the use of military force have 
met with resistance in the population. Most Japanese 
feel that the task of the country’s armed forces con-
sists in defending Japanese territory in cooperation 
with the US as well as contributing to disaster relief 
and UN peacekeeping missions.115 Any further expan-
sion of Japan’s military role in the world, by contrast, 
is rejected by the public. This ardent skepticism with 
respect to the use of military power has always limited 
Tokyo’s room for maneuver in deploying its troops 
abroad (for example, in terms of number of troops or 
constraints on the use of military force).116 Fears that 
the Japanese government could use its armed forces 
to project power in Asia or other regions of the world 
therefore seem unfounded. 
In the past few months Japanese observers have 
been carefully monitoring reactions in neighboring 
states to the security changes under Abe. More left-
leaning newspapers such as “Asahi” or “Mainichi” 
warn against further harming the already strained 
relations with South Korea and China, pointing to the 
widespread distrust shown toward Abe in these coun-
tries.117 Right-leaning newspapers such as “Yomiuri” 
or “Sankei”, by contrast, emphasize that the majority 
of Japan’s neighbors express understanding and even 
support for Abe’s security policy: Indonesia, Singapore, 
the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand, 
for example, all welcome the reinterpretation of Ar-
ticle 9 of the Constitution and look forward to Japan 
contributing more actively to international security.118 
115  Jieitai bōei mondai ni kansuru yoron chōsa, ed. Kabinettsbüro 
(see note 4). 
116  Paul Midford, Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From 
Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
117  “Kiken haramu gunji yūsen shūhenkoku shigeki kinchō 
maneku kenen, shūdanteki jieiken kakugi kettei” [Prioritiza-
tion of military poses risks. There are concerns that neighbor-
ing countries might feel provoked, thereby creating tensions. 
Cabinet decision on the right of collective self-defense], Asahi 
Shimbun, 2 July 2014. 
118  “Shūdanteki jieiken: Chūkan nozoku Kantaiheiyōshoko-
ku wa shiji, Shūhenkoku hantairon no ‘kyozō’” [The right of 
collective self-defense: Pan-Pacific countries excluding China 
and South Korea show support. ‘Illusory image’ of opposition 
among neighboring countries], Sankei Shimbun, 3 August 2014, 
In the right-leaning press, criticism from South Korea 
and China is attributed to political motives. 
 
 
http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/140803/plt1408030008-
n1.html (accessed 5 November 2014). 
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The Three Central Pillars of Japan’s Security Policy 
 
Japan’s security policy is based on three central pillars: 
(1) Japan’s own capabilities and defense measures, 
(2) the alliance with the US, and (3) cooperation with 
other countries. In none of these three areas do the 
most recent security documents indicate a new policy 
orientation. Apart from various shifts in emphasis, 
the precautions and responses to provocations called 
for in the documents are identical to those outlined 
in the Defense Guidelines of 2010. 
However, Abe is pursuing these goals more vigor-
ously than preceding DPJ administrations, even if he 
is constrained by limited financial resources, domestic 
resistance and conflicting interests in partner coun-
tries. Particularly the third security pillar, internation-
al cooperation, has been enhanced significantly under 
Abe – a trend that had already become apparent in 
recent years. The focus is predominantly on bilateral 
efforts and less on cooperation with existing multi-
lateral institutions. 
Japan’s Own Capabilities and 
Defense Measures 
Strategic Plans: 
Mobile and Rapidly Deployable Troops 
According to the NSS, Japan is encouraged to show 
more “diplomatic creativity” and increase its presence 
in international organizations such as the UN – for 
example, by dispatching personnel.119 In terms of 
defining Japan’s own capabilities, however, the focus 
is on the Self-Defense Forces, which in the NSS are de-
scribed as the “ultimate guarantee” of national securi-
ty and protection from threats.120 
Despite the restraints imposed by the Constitution, 
Japan’s armed forces are among the best equipped 
in the world. Although Japan with its 247,000 troops 
ranks only fifth in force levels in East Asia after China, 
the US, North Korea and Russia, in terms of equipment 
and weapons systems its state-of-the-art, professional 
military is in some regards far superior to the forces of 
119  NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 14f. 
120  Ibid., 15. 
those countries. Even China has not yet caught up 
with Japan despite intense efforts to modernize its 
military.121 Among the regional powers Japan is sur-
passed by only the US, China and Russia in defense 
spending, which in Japan totals just over ¥4.8 trillion 
(approximately €37 billion, fiscal year 2014).122 In 
addition, Japan disposes of a well-equipped 13,200-
man coast guard with a budget of approximately ¥183 
billion (approximately €1.4 billion, fiscal year 2014).123 
The new strategy documents emphasize that the 
SDF must concentrate on preparing for gray-zone in-
cidents in the island dispute with China. The central 
objective is to transform the SDF into a “dynamic joint 
defense force” that is rapidly deployable, mobile and 
flexible and in which army, navy and air force closely 
cooperate.124 Furthermore, through a build-up of troops 
in Japan’s southwest island province, Okinawa, and 
regular reconnaissance and surveillance activities in 
the disputed island area, Japan intends to “clearly ex-
press its resolve not to tolerate the change of the status 
quo by force”.125 This announcement is an un-
equivocal warning to China and bolder than in the 
previous Defense Guidelines, in which Japan was 
merely urged to “clearly demonstrate its national will 
and its strong defense capabilities.”126 
However, the new concept of a “dynamic joint 
defense force” is only marginally different from the 
one published by the DPJ administration in 2010. The 
former approach was also aimed at creating a more 
rapidly deployable, more mobile military that could 
deter China and North Korea from provocations by 
demonstrating its capabilities. The new NDPG em-
121  Klein, Russland als euro-pazifische Macht (see note 35), 19. 
122  Defense of Japan 2014, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense, http:// 
www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html (accessed 2 October 
2014); Klein, Russland als euro-pazifische Macht (see note 35), 19. 
123  Japan Coast Guard, Kaijō Honanchō Panfuretto [Brochure 
on the Japan Coast Guard], March 2014, 3, http://www.kaiho. 
mlit.go.jp/jpam.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2014). 
124  NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 15; NDPG 
2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 7f. 
125  NDPG 2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 13f. 
126  National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond, 
ed. Japan Ministry of Defense, 17 December 2010, 6, http:// 
www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf 
(accessed 13 June 2014). 
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Japan’s Own Capabilities and Defense Measures 
phasize that Japan should not only strive to deter gray-
zone situations but must be ready for action at all 
times. Even if there is no clear evidence of an armed 
attack, Japan must be in a position to react “seamless-
ly”.127 In addition, the Guidelines oblige the country to 
fortify its defense capabilities in such a manner that it 
can ensure maritime and air superiority even if faced 
with military escalation.128 
Before the drafting of the new National Defense 
Program Guidelines, the question of whether Japan 
needed to prepare itself for a retaliatory or even pre-
ventive strike on North Korean missile bases had led 
to heated debates. LDP politicians, among them Prime 
Minister Abe, advocated utilizing the new Guidelines 
to seek such capabilities, for example by acquiring 
cruise missiles. But Abe’s coalition partner, the Komei-
to, rejected the highly contentious proposals.129 As a 
result, the Guidelines state merely that Japan will con-
tinue to explore possible ways of responding to the 
missile threat.130 
Implementation: 
The Island Dispute as a Central Theme 
The Abe administration continues to pursue the most 
important armament plans of its predecessors, par-
ticularly the modernization of the navy and air force. 
The top priorities remain unchanged: upgrading sur-
veillance and reconnaissance capabilities, repelling 
ballistic missile attacks, reacting more quickly and 
flexibly to provocations, and ensuring maritime and 
air superiority.131 To this end, the fleet of diesel-elec-
tric propelled Soryu-class submarines is to be increased 
from 16 to 22 units. Two Izumo-class “helicopter de-
storyers”, which can transport up to 14 helicopters, 
are currently under construction and are scheduled to 
be delivered between 2015 and 2017. These destroyers 
are capable of repelling submarine attacks.132 In order 
127  NDPG 2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 13. 
128  Ibid., 19. 
129  “Japan Eyes Cruise Missiles to Attack N. Korea”, Chosun 
Ilbo, 21 February 2013, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/ 
html_dir/2013/02/21/2013022101139.html (accessed 5 June 
2014). 
130  “Shasetsu: Abe seiken no anpo senryaku, heiwa shugi 
o torichigaeruna” [Editorial: The security strategy of the Abe 
administration – do not mistake it for pacifism], Asahi Shim-
bun, 18 December 2013. 
131  NDPG 2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21). 
132  Heisei 21 nendo seisaku hyōka sho [Policy evaluation for fis-
cal year 2009], ed. Japan Ministry of Defense, October 2009, 
to improve its ability to intercept ballistic missiles, 
Japan has decided to increase the number of Aegis 
destroyers equipped with modern SM-3 missile defense 
systems from four to six. And like the previous admin-
istration, Abe plans to equip the air force with 42 F-35 
multirole combat aircraft. With this equipment, Japan 
will increasingly dispose of power projection capabil-
ities that it has previously eschewed due to the defen-
sive focus of its security policy.133 
In anticipation of future military conflicts over the 
Senkaku Islands, the Abe administration is stepping 
up implementation of the provisions contained in the 
most recent strategy documents. To begin with, Tokyo 
decided in December 2013 to establish an amphibian 
unit similar to the US Marine Corps. It is to be com-
posed of members of all three branches of the armed 
forces and in the case of an enemy invasion be in a 
position to land on islands and recapture them. Al-
though joint amphibian training between the US 
Marines and SDF troops had already taken place under 
the DPJ administration, Tokyo had thus far rejected 
the establishment of such a special force as too offen-
sive.134 The new unit is to grow to 3,000 troops within 
five years and be stationed in southwest Japan, on 
either the Kyushu Islands or the Nansei Islands.135 In 
order to provide the troops with terrestrial capabili-
ties, Japan plans to purchase seventeen V-22 Osprey 
tilt-rotor aircraft with vertical lift and landing capa-
bility as well as 52 amphibian vehicles, including 
the AAV-7 (Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7), a floatable 
armored vehicle used by the US Marines.136 
Second, the Abe administration is reinforcing the 
presence of the Self-Defense Forces in the immediate 
vicinity of the disputed Senkaku Islands. In April 2014 
Japan began construction of a radar station and base 
for around 100 soldiers on Yonaguni – Japan’s western- 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/hyouka/seisaku/results/21/ 
jizen/honbun/01.pdf (accessed 14 August 2014). 
133  Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization (London: 
Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2009), 51.  
134  Justin Goldman, “An Amphibious Capability in Japan’s 
Self-Defense Force: Operationalizing Dynamic Defense”, Naval 
War College Review 66, no. 4 (2013): 117–34 (125). 
135  Yuka Hayashi, “Japan Builds Amphibious Force Modeled 
on U.S. Marines”, Wall Street Journal, 18 July 2014, http:// online. 
wsj.com/articles/japan-builds-amphibious-force-modeled-on-
us-marines-1405597172 (accessed 15 August 2014). 
136  Koji Sonoda, “A Lot of New Equipment Purchases in 
Latest 5-year Defense Plan”, Asahi Shimbun, 14 December 2013, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ20131214
0033 (accessed 20 December 2013). 
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Fig. 2 
The Japanese Defense Budget (in ¥ trillion), fiscal years 2000–2014 
Note: ¥5 trillion corresponds to approximately u38 billion (in March 2015). The expenditures do not include the costs  
of ameliorating the negative effects of the US military presence on the local population in Okinawa. 
Source: White Book 2014. 
 
most island, located just over 100 kilometers from 
Taiwan and around 150 kilometers from the Senkaku 
Islands (see map).137 In establishing this base, Abe is 
carrying out a plan drafted by the DPJ administration 
in 2011. Further bases are to be built in the coming 
years on the islands of Amami Oshima, Ishigakijima 
and Miyakojima in southwestern Japan.138 Further-
more, by 2016 the coast guard is to be enlarged by the 
addition of a 600-man unit exclusively responsible for 
patrolling the disputed island area.139 All these meas-
ures are designed to enable Japan to respond more 
quickly in a future conflict over the Senkaku Islands. 
Third, the Abe administration plans to acquire 
three Global Hawk reconnaissance drones in fiscal 
year 2015. The drones will help Japan to conduct 
 
137  “Bōei shō, yonaguni jima ni kanshi shisetsu chakkō” 
[Ministry of Defense begins construction of surveillance 
station on Yonaguni], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 20 April 2014. 
138  “Ritō bōei ‘kūhaku’ o kaishō, amami ni rikuji, senkaku 
no kanshi kyōka” [Elimination of the ‘vacuum’ in the defense 
of remote islands, ground forces on the Amami island chain, 
reinforcing surveillance around the Senkaku Islands], Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, 24 August 2014.  
139  Cherrie Lou Billone, “Japan Coast Guard to Form 600-
member Unit Tasked Solely with Patrolling Senkakus”, Japan 
Daily Press, 31 January 2013, http://japandailypress.com/ 
japan-coast-guard-to-form-600-member-unit-tasked-solely-
with-patrolling-senkakus-3122472/ (accessed 3 August 2014). 
reconnaissance and surveillance of Chinese activities 
around the Senkaku Islands. The fact that Japan’s ally, 
the US, stationed these very drones on the southern 
Japanese island of Kyushu in May 2014 facilitates the 
exchange of data.140 In addition, Japan and the US 
plan to jointly develop an unmanned reconnaissance 
submarine in the coming years.141 
The financial scope is limited, however, when it 
comes to providing the armed forces with additional 
personnel and more modern equipment. Japan’s 
national debt has already grown to two-and-a-half 
times its annual economic output. It is worth noting 
in this context that only about 17 percent of the 
defense budget is spent on new arms purchases while 
44 percent is spent on personnel.142 Although Japan 
increased its defense budget in fiscal year 2013 by 0.8 
percent and then again by 2.2 percent in 2014, these 
 
140  US Air Force, Misawa Base, “RQ-4 Global Hawk Arrives 
at Misawa”, Misawa Air Base, 23 May 2014, http://www.misawa. 
af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123412132 (accessed 20 August 
2014). 
141  “Japan, U.S. to Develop Unmanned Submarine”, Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 8 August 2014, http://the-japan-news.com/news/ 
article/0001482239 (accessed 9 August 2014). 
142  Defense of Japan 2014, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see 
note 122). Additional costs incurred include the repair and 
maintenance of bases. 
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increases came on the heels of a decade of budget cuts 
(see Fig. 2). Furthermore, the budget increase was par-
tially eaten up by the rising cost of imports caused by 
the weak yen.143 
The Alliance with the US 
Strategic Plans: 
Smooth Cooperation with Washington 
Japan’s relationship with the US, based on shared 
strategic interests and values, is considered a “corner-
stone” of Japanese foreign and security policy.144 In 
the US-Japanese security treaty, signed in 1951 and 
revised in 1960, Washington commits to guarantee 
Japan’s security. In exchange, Japan allows the US to 
maintain bases on Okinawa and the Honshu Peninsu-
la, where around 49,000 US soldiers are currently 
stationed.145 According to the NSS, the alliance plays 
an “indispensable” role in the peace and security of 
Japan and the whole Asia-Pacific region. 
According to the NDPG, the alliance should con-
tinue to be intensified in order to effectively deter 
aggressors and increase Japan’s security.146 Tokyo in-
tends to expand joint exercises and surveillance activi-
ties as well as bilateral crisis planning.147 Further-
more, together with its allies Japan intends to 
contribute to international stability, for instance 
through capacity building, international peacekeep-
ing operations, and joint initiatives in humanitarian 
missions or emergency response management. These 
goals are already outlined in the Defense Guidelines of 
2010. 
In the documents published under Abe, two points 
are given particular emphasis. First, there is a call for 
“seamless cooperation” with the US in all situations, 
143  Kiichi Fujiwara, Yuichi Hosoya and Akiko Yamanaka, 
“Year Two of the Abe Administration: Prospects for the Future 
of Japanese Foreign Policy”, in Chatham House Asia Summary 
11 (2014), 3, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/ 
chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/
20140211AbeAdministrationFujiwaraHosoyaYamanaka.pdf 
(accessed 25 June 2014). 
144  NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 20; NDPG 
2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 8. 
145  “US Forces in Japan. Welcome”, U.S. Forces Japan Official 
Website, http://www.usfj.mil/Welcome.html (accessed 15 
August 2014). 
146  NDPG 2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 9; 
NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 20. 
147  NDPG 2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21, 9. 
with gray-zone incidents explicitly mentioned.148 
Second, the new strategy documents emphasize more 
strongly that Japan has a duty to ensure the “smooth 
and effective stationing” of US troops.149 Although it is 
acknowledged that the massive US military presence 
has a negative effect on the quality of life of the local 
population – through environmental contamination, 
noise pollution or restrictions due to military zones, 
the goal of reducing the number of US troops in the 
Okinawa region seems to be of secondary importance. 
Implementation: Resolving the “Futenma” Dispute 
As announced in the security documents, the Abe 
administration is pressing for even closer cooperation 
with Washington. It is with this goal in mind that 
the Prime Minister has ordered a revision of the 1997 
Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, to be 
completed by mid-2015 – a step earlier advocated by 
his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda of the DPJ. The Guide-
lines define the role and tasks of the armed forces of 
the two countries during joint operations. As part 
of the revision process, Tokyo intends to develop strat-
egies and plans in preparation for a potential conflict 
over the Senkaku Islands.150 
Abe is also anxious to bring closure to the long-
standing tug-of-war over the relocation of US Air 
Station Futenma on Okinawa Island. His efforts have 
met with resounding approval in Washington. As 
early as 1996, the two allies agreed to relocate the heli-
port from the city of Ginowan to a less densely popu-
lated area. But the implementation of this agreement 
has been repeatedly hindered because the majority of 
Okinawans oppose the construction of a new base.151 
The local protest movement received a boost from the 
DPJ election campaign promise of 2009 to move the 
entire 4,000-man base to another prefecture – a prom-
ise that proved impossible to enforce against the will 
of the US.152 Under enormous pressure from the Abe 
148  Ibid. 
149  NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 22; NDPG 
2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 10. 
150  “Japan, U.S. Agree to Revise Defense Guidelines by End 
of 2014”, Asahi Shimbun, 1 October 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/ 
article/behind_news/politics/AJ201310010069 (accessed 25 
October 2013). 
151  Emma Chanlett-Avery et al., Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for 
Congress, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congres-
sional Research Service, 20 February 2014), 1. 
152  Christopher W. Hughes, “The Democratic Party of Japan’s 
New (But Failing) Grand Security Strategy: From ‘Reluctant 
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administration, Okinawa’s governor, Hirokazu 
Nakaima, finally abandoned resistance to the reloca-
tion plans. He then authorized a landfill in the Bay 
of Henoko in northwestern Okinawa, where the new 
base with two landing strips was to be built. Nakai-
ma’s consent removed the last impediment to the 
relocation plans. In return, Tokyo pledged to provide 
the prefecture with over ¥30 billion (around €2 bil-
lion) in annual economic aid through 2021.153 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that US Air Station 
Futenma will now be quickly relocated. In January 
2014 Abe’s plans were dealt a serious setback in 
mayoral elections in the city of Nago, which belongs 
to Henoko. Susumu Inamine, an opponent of the 
Henoko base, was re-elected for a second term and 
vowed resistance.154 The November 2014 gubernatorial 
elections in Okinawa were also won by an opponent 
of the base, Takeshi Onaga, who replaces former gover-
nor Nakaima. It will be extremely difficult to carry 
out the Henoko plans against the resistance of local 
administrations. 
Abe’s efforts to intensify cooperation with the US 
have met with resistance elsewhere as well. In July 
2013 Tokyo decided to take part in negotiations over 
a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP), which were spear-
headed by Washington. The planned free-trade zone, 
to which, in addition to Japan and the US, Australia, 
Brunei, Chile, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore and Vietnam intend to accede, is con-
sidered the most important component of Obama’s 
policy of “rebalancing” toward Asia.155 But as Tokyo 
and Washington hold widely diverging views regard-
ing the market liberalization of Japan’s agricultural 
sector, it is difficult to predict how talks will proceed 
and whether Japan will accede to the agreement.156 
Abe also caused disgruntlement by visiting the 
divisive Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013, at which 
Realism’ to ‘Resentful Realism’?”, Journal of Japanese Studies 38, 
no. 1 (2012): 109–40. 
153  Gavan McCormack, “Bitter Soup for Okinawans – The 
Governor’s Year-End Betrayal”, The Asia-Pacific Journal 12, 
no. 1:2 (2014), http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/4056 
(accessed 5 February 2014). 
154  “Nago shichōsen Henoko hantai, Inamine-shi saisen” 
[Mayoral election in Nago against Henoko, another election 
victory for Inamine], Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 January 2014. 
155  Chanlett-Avery et al., Japan-U.S. Relations (see note 151), 31. 
156  “TPP May Leave Japan Behind: U.S. Farm Chief”, Japan 
Times, 29 April 2014, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/ 
04/29/business/economy-business/tpp-may-proceed-without-
japan-fails-open-agriculture-sector/#.U-tkTBBCyaM (accessed 
20 August 2014). 
Japanese war victims – including convicted war crimi-
nals from World War II – are commemorated. The US 
was extraordinarily trenchant in its criticism of the 
visit and warned Japan against further damaging 
its already strained relations with South Korea and 
China.157 Washington fears that the incident could 
complicate security coordination between its two most 
important allies, Japan and South Korea – irrespective 
of the tense situation in North Korea and China.158 
Cooperation with Other Countries 
Strategic Plans: 
Bilateral Cooperation and Maritime Order 
The third pillar of Japanese security policy, Tokyo’s 
cooperation with other countries, is addressed more 
extensively in the new security documents than in 
previous ones. Focus continues to be placed on bilat-
eral cooperation and less on existing multilateral 
institutions and security fora such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) or 
the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-
Plus).159 In the Asia Pacific region Japan prefers to 
pursue security cooperation with countries that share 
its “universal values and strategic interests”.160 Among 
these are South Korea, Australia, several ASEAN mem-
ber states, and India – countries that were already 
listed in the previous Guidelines. The new Security 
Strategy highlights South Korea as a “neighboring 
country of the utmost geopolitical importance”.161 
Relations with Seoul play an important role for re-
gional stability and in confronting the threat posed 
byNorth Korea. With a view to strengthening relations 
among US allies in Asia, the new strategy documents 
for the first time call on Japan to pursue trilateral 
security cooperation among the US, Japan and other 
allies like South Korea, Australia or India.162 
157  George Nishiyama, “Abe Visit to Controversial Japanese 
Shrine Draws Rare U.S. Criticism”, Wall Street Journal, 26 Decem-
ber 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052 
702304483804579281103015121712 (accessed 13 January 2014). 
158  Chanlett-Avery et al., Japan-U.S. Relations (see note 151), 1. 
159  See also: Gudrun Wacker, Sicherheitskooperation in Ostasien. 
Strukturen, Trends und Leistungsgrenzen [Security cooperation in 
East Asia. Structures, trends and limitations],Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2015 (SWP-Studie S2/2015). 
160  NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 23.  
161  Ibid. 
162  NDPG 2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 11; 
NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 26. 
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With respect to Russia and China, the old Guide-
lines called for confidence-building measures and the 
promotion of cooperative relations without differen-
tiating between the two countries.163 The new docu-
ments, by contrast, dedicate a separate section to 
Russia in which Japan is urged to pursue active secu-
rity dialogue and enhanced bilateral cooperation. 
Improving relations with Russia and working with 
Moscow to “[secure] peace and stability of the Asia-
Pacific region” is described as “critical for Japan”.164 
On the subject of cooperation with China, on the 
other hand, there is little difference between the old 
and new documents. Japan supports bilateral dialogue 
and confidence-building measures and encourages 
China to behave as a responsible and constructive 
international actor. Beijing’s attempts to change the 
status quo in territorial disputes by coercion are to 
be countered “firmly but in a calm manner”.165 
Japan’s intention to create a maritime order based 
on international law and the freedom of navigation 
constitutes a further focus in the new strategy docu-
ments.166 On the one hand, Tokyo is expected to help 
establish international maritime rules, for example by 
supporting the Code of Conduct for the South China 
Sea proposed by ASEAN.167 On the other hand, Japan 
intends to work more closely with countries abutting 
its most important shipping routes, above all in South-
east Asia, and to improve their ability to monitor coast-
al waters through joint training (capability building 
assistance).168 By empowering these countries, Japan 
can actively help to create stability in the region.169 
Implementation: Old and New Partners 
The government in Tokyo has long been criticized 
both at home and abroad for allowing Japan to 
become a client state of the US through its one-sided 
dependence on the US to guarantee its security.170 
163  National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond, 
ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 9. 
164  NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 25. 
165  Ibid.  
166  NDPG 2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 4; 
NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 17. 
167  NSS, ed. Prime Minister of Japan (see note 66), 8, 24. 
168  Ibid., 17. 
169  NDPG 2013, ed. Japan Ministry of Defense (see note 21), 16. 
170  Wilhelm Vosse, “Grundzüge und Tendenzen der japani-
schen Außenpolitik”[Main features and tendencies in Japane-
se foreign policy], in Japan 2007, ed. Deutsche Vereinigung für 
sozialwissenschaftliche Japanforschung [German Association 
Over the past decade or so, however, Japan has 
stepped up its efforts to establish additional security 
partnerships and consolidate existing ones. Prime 
Minister Abe is vigorously pursuing this objective. 
Unlike the previous administration, Abe strives for 
rapprochement with Russia and North Korea. His 
stance toward China, by contrast, is more confronta-
tional. Unless it constructively engages Beijing, how-
ever, Tokyo will not be able to live up its own goal of 
establishing a maritime order based on common rules. 
Japan’s “Pivot South”: A Coalition of the Willing 
According to the strategy documents, Japan’s diversifi-
cation efforts are directed primarily toward Australia, 
India and ASEAN member states, among the latter par-
ticularly the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia. Tokyo 
is interested in partners who are equally concerned 
about China’s rise and who also champion democratic 
values, though Vietnam does not fulfil the second 
criterion. Through cooperation with strategic partners 
of the US, Japan wants to contribute to US security 
strategy and respond to the global power shift.171 The 
impressive pace set by Tokyo in pursuing security co-
operation with these countries has prompted some 
observers to use the term “pivot south” – analogous to 
the US “pivot to Asia”.172 
The strategic partnership with Australia is particu-
larly well-established. In 2007 Tokyo and Canberra 
signed the “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation”, 
in which they pledged to coordinate more closely 
on regional strategic issues, intensify intelligence 
cooperation and conduct joint military exercises.173 
Since then, so-called 2+2 talks have been held regu-
larly and attended by the two countries’ foreign and 
defense ministers. Since 2006, Tokyo and Canberra 
have been holding trilateral security talks together 
with the US (Trilateral Strategic Dialogue).174 Further-
for Social Science Research on Japan] (Hamburg, 2007):  
101–124 (115). 
171  New Security Strategy of Japan: Multilayered and Cooperative 
Security Strategy, 8 October ed. Policy Research Division, Tokyo 
Foundation (2008), 21f., http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/ 
additional_info/New%20Security%20Strategy%20of%20Japan. 
pdf (accessed 30 August 2014). 
172  Wallace, “Japan’s Strategic Pivot South” (see note 108). 
173  Japan’s Security Strategy toward China, ed. Tokyo Foundation 
(see note 7), 54f. 
174  Daisuke Akimoto, “The Japan-Australia Security Align-
ment: Its Development and the Implications for Regional In-
tegration of the Asia-Pacific”, in Electronic Journal of Contempo-
rary Japanese Studies 13, no. 4 (2013), http://www.japanesestudies. 
org.uk/ejcjs/vol13/iss4/akimoto.html (accessed 14 May 2014). 
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more, Japan and Australia have signed an agreement 
on data security (2012) and a so-called Acquisition 
and Cross-Servicing Agreement (2013) aimed at formal-
izing mutual logistic support during military opera-
tions.175 
Japan has also intensified its cooperation with 
India. In 2008 Tokyo and New Delhi signed a “Joint 
Declaration on Security Cooperation”; the following 
year they adopted an implementation action plan. 
Since 2010 high representatives of the foreign and 
defense ministries have been holding annual 2+2 
talks.176 A trilateral strategic dialogue has existed 
with the US since 2011.177 The maritime forces of the 
two countries conducted two joint training sessions 
in 2012 and 2013. In 2015, Tokyo and New Delhi are 
furthermore likely to conclude a deal for the sale of 
at least twelve Japanese US-2 amphibian aircraft.178 
Japan is also pursuing close security cooperation with 
ASEAN countries, as evidenced by its strategic partner-
ships with Indonesia (since 2006), Vietnam (2009), the 
Philippines (2011), Thailand (2012), Cambodia (2013) 
and ASEAN itself (2011).179 In only eleven months in 
office, Abe visited all ten ASEAN member states, thus 
demonstrating the importance he attaches to South-
east Asia. He was the first Japanese Premier to do this.180 
As the most recent security documents show, Japan 
is especially committed to providing capacity-building 
assistance in Southeast Asia. Tokyo supports the devel-
opment of paramilitary and military capabilities in 
175  Hayley Channer, Andrew Davies and Peter Jennings, 
Something New under the Rising Sun: Expanding Australia-Japan 
Defence Cooperation, ASPI Policy Analysis no. 111 (Barton, AUS: 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2013), https://www. 
aspi. org.au/publications/something-new-under-the-rising-sun-
expanding-australia-japan-defence-cooperation-by-hayley-
channer,-andrew-davies-and-peter-jennings (accessed 14 April 
2014). 
176  Daniel M. Kliman and Daniel Twining, Japan’s Democracy 
Diplomacy, GMF Asia Paper Series, 11 July 2014, 14, http://www. 
spf.org/media/upload/3_GMF_final.pdf (accessed 12 July 2014). 
177  Ibid., 15. 
178  “India and Japan Inch Closer to Surveillance Aircraft 
Deal”, The Diplomat, 5 March 2015 http://thediplomat.com/ 
2015/03/india-and-japan-inch-closer-to-surveillance-aircraft-
deal/ (accessed 9 March 2015). 
179  Thuy Thi Do, Locating Vietnam-Japan’s Strategic Partnership 
in the Changing East Asian Political Landscape, JIIA Paper, 11 July 
2014, http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/140711_ 
Vietnam-Japan_Strategic_Partnership-Final_paper_Thuy_ 
Thi_Do.pdf (accessed 30 July 2014). 
180  “With Visits to all 10 ASEAN Nations, Abe’s China Con-
tainment Strategy Complete”, Asahi Shimbun, 18 November 
2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/ 
AJ201311180082 (accessed 25 November 2013). 
ASEAN countries through joint exercises and infra-
structure projects. In fiscal year 2011, the Japan Minis-
try of Defense set up a Capacity Building Assistance 
Office that helps other countries to develop their dis-
aster relief and coastal waters surveillance capabili-
ties. In order to avoid giving China the impression 
that a containment policy is being established, the 
program includes projects outside the Asia Pacific 
region.181 The budget, at ¥236 million (€1.8 million, 
fiscal year 2014), is currently very limited but could 
be increased considerably in the coming years.182 
The Abe administration caused a great stir by 
announcing plans in December 2013 and August 
2014, respectively, to deliver ten patrol boats to the 
Philippines and six to the Vietnamese coast guards – 
thereby implementing plans of the previous DPJ ad-
ministration.183 For Manila, the delivery amounts to 
more than a doubling of its fleet, from nine to nine-
teen ships.184 Although this capability boost in the 
Philippines and Vietnam does little to shift the power 
balance vis-à-vis China with its powerful military, 
it nevertheless signals that Tokyo is not prepared to 
stand by listlessly and watch Beijing’s aggressive 
behavior in the South China Sea. Japanese political 
scientist Yoshihide Soeya sees Tokyo’s security policy 
as an attempt to form its own “coalition of the willing” 
in order to prevent China from forcefully asserting its 
territorial claims.185 
Japan and South Korea are linked by shared values 
such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law 
181  Yoshihiro Makino, “Defense Ministry Quietly Begins 
Providing Assistance to Military Forces Overseas”, Asahi Shim-
bun, 27 August 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_ 
news/AJ201208270082 (accessed 13 August 2014). 
182  Heisei 25nen gyōsei jigyō rebyū shiito, nōryoku kōchiku shien 
jigyō, jigyō bangō 11 [Administrative assessment 2013: Assign-
ment Number 11 on Capability Building Assistance], ed. 
Japan Ministry of Defense, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/ 
others/service/kanshi_koritsu/h25_res/r-sheet/0011.pdf 
(accessed 28 August 2014). 
183  Vu Trong Khanh, “Japan to Help Vietnam Improve Mari-
time Capability”, Wall Street Journal, 1 August 2014, http:// 
online.wsj.com/articles/japan-to-help-vietnam-improve-
maritime-capability-1406883961 (accessed 2 August 2014). 
184  Jerry E. Esplanada, “Patrol Boats from Japan to Start 
Arriving in 2015”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 31 March 2014, 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/590453/patrol-boats-from-japan-
to-start-arriving-in-2015 (accessed 2 August 2014). 
185  Martin Fackler, “Japan Is Flexing Its Military Muscle 
to Counter a Rising China”, New York Times, 26 November 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/world/asia/japan-
expands-its-regional-military-role.html?pagewanted=all 
(accessed 2 August 2014). 
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as well as by similar strategic interests in relation to 
North Korea and China. Both are allies of the US. One 
would expect them to be close security partners. But 
despite the declarations in the most recent strategy 
documents, Seoul is hardly taken into account by the 
Japanese government in its “pivot south”. Closer co-
operation is repeatedly hindered by historical animos-
ities that have never been sufficiently laid to rest and 
by a territorial dispute. Since Abe assumed office, rela-
tions have again deteriorated, which can be attributed 
to the Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine 
and his apologetic stance in the dispute over the “com-
fort women”, predominantly Korean women forced to 
serve as prostitutes by the Japanese army during the 
colonial period. The tensions reveal the fragile nature 
of the bilateral relationship between Japan and South 
Korea. 
Value-oriented Foreign Policy and the Isolation of China 
Abe emphasizes the foreign policy significance of 
values such as democracy, rule of law and respect for 
human rights more vocally than his predecessors. As 
early as his first term in office, in 2006/2007, he propa-
gated a value-oriented foreign policy.186 He was criti-
cized both at home and abroad for precluding coopera-
tion with China by emphasizing these values.187 Abe’s 
plan to initiate a formal “quadrilateral partnership” 
among the US, Japan, India and Australia was con-
demned by Beijing as a containment strategy. As a 
result, India and Australia promptly discontinued the 
cooperation begun by the group of four in 2007.188 
After Abe’s resignation, both the LDP and the DPJ 
administrations intensified bilateral cooperation with 
India and Australia but avoided explicitly ostracizing 
China by focusing on values.189 
186  Yuichi Hosoya, “The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Grand 
Strategy: The ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ and the Future 
Asian Order”, Asia Pacific Review 18, no. 1 (2011): 13–24. 
187  “‘Kachi no gaikō’ wa nihon gaikō no shin-kijiku to 
narieru ka – dai 166 kokkai ni okeru gaikō rongi no shōten” 
[Can ‘value-oriented foreign policy‘ constitute a new maxim 
for Japan’s foreign policy? Focal points of the foreign policy 
debate in the 166th session of parliament], Rippō to Chōsa 272, 
no. 9 (2007): 3f. 
188  Kliman and Twining, Japan’s Democracy Diplomacy (see 
note 176), 17. 
189  Ken Jimbo, “Long Term Outlook for Japan’s Foreign and 
Security Policies”, The Tokyo Foundation Website, 8 May 2009, 
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2009/long-term-
outlook-for-japan2019s-foreign-and-security-policies (accessed 
12 April 2014). 
In Abe’s second tenure, however, it has become 
clear that his value-oriented foreign policy is indeed 
aimed at containing and ostracizing China. In his own 
words, he intends to form a “democratic security dia-
mond for Asia” with the involvement of Japan, the US 
(Hawaii), India and Australia. In making this proposal, 
Abe intends to resuscitate cooperation among the four 
largest Indo-Pacific democracies.190 As the South China 
Sea threatens to become the “Beijing Sea”, he argues, 
the group of four must keep China’s hegemonial aspi-
rations in check and safeguard freedom of navigation 
from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific Region.191 
Abe also invites the UK and France, as democratic sea-
faring nations, to contribute to stability in Asia. Fur-
thermore, in his speeches Abe continually demands 
that international law be respected – also a veiled 
criticism of China and its aggressive behavior in the 
territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas. 
In a keynote address delivered at a forum for security 
experts during the so-called Shangri-La Dialogue in 
Singapore in May 2014, Abe pledged to stand by any 
Southeast Asian countries that see their territorial in-
tegrity threatened by Beijing’s growing assertiveness.192 
It is not difficult to see that Abe’s value-oriented 
foreign policy is a pretext for isolating China. How 
else can one explain his close cooperation with auto-
cratically-governed Vietnam? But many Japanese 
observers doubt that Abe’s policy will endure since 
China, as a central actor in important regional secu-
rity issues (such as the Taiwan issue or North Korea), 
cannot be excluded.193 
With his confrontational value-based foreign policy, 
Abe has not been able to make any substantial progress 
in the Sino-Japanese relationship in the first two years 
of his tenure, even if he insists that he wants to build 
“a mutually beneficial relationship based on common 
190  Yuichi Hosoya, “Japan’s Two Strategies for East Asia: 
The Evolution of Japan’s Diplomatic Strategy”, Asia-Pacific 
Review 20, no. 2 (2013): 146–56 (154). 
191  Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, 
Project Syndicate, 27 December 2012, http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-
india-by-shinzo-abe (accessed 27 December 2012). 
192  Shinzo Abe, Shangri-La Dialogue 2014 Keynote Address, May 
2014, International Institute for Strategic Studies, https:// 
www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/ 
2014-c20c/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-b0b2/ 
keynote-address-shinzo-abe-a787 (accessed 1 June 2014). 
193  Tanaka Hitoshi, Forging a Common Regional Approach to 
China, East Asia Insights 9:3 (Tokyo: Japan Center for Inter-
national Exchange, July 2014), 3. 
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strategic interests” with Beijing.194 In the multilateral 
context, Japan is conspicuously short on creative ideas 
regarding how to constructively integrate China into 
a rule-based international order. Even so, Tokyo suc-
ceeded in arranging a bilateral summit on the mar-
gins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum that took place in Beijing in mid-November 
2014, made possible in part by repeated visits to 
Beijing by Shotaro Yachi, head of the National Security 
Secretariat, and former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. 
Beijing had previously ruled out bilateral summit talks, 
saying that Abe had hurt the feelings of the Chinese 
people by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Controversial Relations: Russia and North Korea 
While Japan’s cooperation efforts in the Indo-Pacific 
region generally meet with the approval of its ally, 
the US, Washington views Abe’s rapprochement with 
Russia and North Korea with suspicion. The Obama 
administration fears that Tokyo’s bilateral efforts 
could undermine international attempts to deal 
with the Ukraine crisis and North Korea’s nuclear 
program.195 
Since 2013 Japanese-Russian relations have im-
proved considerably. In April 2013 Abe visited Mos-
cow, ten years after the last official visit to Russia by a 
Japanese prime minister.196 During the visit, Abe and 
Putin agreed to hold regular 2+2 talks between the 
two sides’ foreign and defense ministers. A first 2+2 
meeting took place in November 2013. In February 
2014 Abe attended the opening ceremony of the 
Olympic Games in Sochi while the other G7 heads of 
government stayed home in protest against human 
rights violations in Russia. 
There are several reasons for Tokyo’s rapproche-
ment with Moscow. Since the Fukushima nuclear 
catastrophe, Japan’s need for energy has grown, as a 
result of which Tokyo plans to import more liquefied 
natural gas from Russia. Furthermore, Abe is hoping 
for an historic breakthrough in relations with Russia, 
194  “Japan PM Says Door Always Open for China Talks”, 
Channel News Asia, 8 July 2014, http://www.channelnewsasia. 
com/news/asiapacific/japan-pm-says-door-always/1244520. html 
(accessed 10 July 2014). 
195  “Washington Irritated by Abe Diplomacy on Russia, 
North Korea”, Asahi Shimbun, 26 July 2014, http://ajw.asahi. 
com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201407260033 (accessed 
27 July 2014). 
196  Dmitri Streltsov, “Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s Visit 
to Russia”, East Asia Forum, 15 May 2013, http://www. 
eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/15/japanese-prime-minister-abes-
visit-to-russia/ (accessed 18 May 2013). 
not least because of his country’s poor relations with 
China and North Korea. Both Abe and Putin seek 
to end the territorial dispute over the four southern 
islands of the Kuril chain and to conclude a peace 
treaty seven decades after the Second World War. A 
further motivation for expanding the security partner-
ship with Moscow is Tokyo’s fear of an increasingly 
assertive China. Due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 
rapprochement has been put on hold for the time 
being. In response to the escalating Ukraine crisis, 
Tokyo imposed sanctions against Russia in April and 
August 2014. But these are limited measures that do 
not hit Russia particularly hard.197 Japan is unlikely 
to get tough with Russia anytime soon, for otherwise 
Moscow could be prompted to seek closer relations 
with China.198 
Under Abe there are also signs of movement in 
Japan’s relations with North Korea, which have been 
at a standstill for years. In July 2014 the Japanese gov-
ernment announced that it would relax sanctions 
imposed on the communist regime. In return, Pyong-
yang pledged to investigate the whereabouts of Japa-
nese citizens abducted to North Korea. Tokyo thereby 
hopes to clarify the fate of those who disappeared in 
the 1970s and 1980s – a goal to which Abe committed 
himself long ago. The US and South Korea fear, how-
ever, that in the course of trying to shed light on the 
fate of the disappeared, Japan could veer away from 
the common policy toward North Korea. 
Regional Cooperation: Strengthening Cohesion in ASEAN 
According to the strategy documents, Tokyo supports 
regional institutions such as the East Asia Summit 
(EAS) or the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) but does not 
give them priority. Japan views functional cooperation 
in a multilateral context, such as disaster relief activi-
ties, as a contribution to confidence-building.199 But 
considering Beijing’s aggressive behavior in territorial 
197  Cf. Nadine Godehardt, Alexandra Sakaki and Christian 
Wagner, Krise in der Ukraine – Kaum Reaktionen in Asien. Nationale 
Interessen gegenüber Russland haben Vorrang für China, Indien und 
Japan [Crisis in Ukraine – Scant reaction in Asia. National in-
terests vis-à-vis Russia take precedence for China, India and 
Japan], SWP Comments 33/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, May 2014). 
198  “Tokyo-Pyongyang Abduction Talks Still on Despite 
N. Korean Missile Launch”, Asahi Shimbun, 30 June 2014, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ20140 
6300036 (accessed 1 July 2014). 
199  Hideshi Futori, Japan’s Disaster Relief Diplomacy: Fostering 
Military Cooperation in Asia, Asia Pacific Bulletin 213 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: East-West Center, May 2013). 
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disputes, Tokyo has little hope that China will allow 
itself to be “socialized” in regional institutions and 
thereby accept existing international norms and prac-
tices. 
On the contrary, Tokyo and Beijing are increasingly 
competing for influence in regional fora.200 The rivalry 
between the two major powers thereby hinders the 
development of a durably viable security architecture. 
At both the establishment of the EAS in 2005 and the 
start of negotiations over the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), Japan insisted in each 
case on involving Australia, New Zealand and India in 
order to restrain China’s dominance.201 In recent years 
Japan has increasingly tried to strengthen the cohesion 
and significance of ASEAN in order to provide mem-
bers with collective backing in their dealings with 
China.202 For example, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda 
pledged ¥2 billion (approx. €15 million) for projects 
designed to boost integration within ASEAN.203 At 
a summit meeting of the organization in December 
2013, Abe also declared his support for Southeast 
Asian integration efforts and pledged a further ¥2 bil-
lion in development aid.204 
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Those who believe that Japanese security policy has 
changed course fail to take into account that it has 
been undergoing a gradual transformation since as 
early as the end of the Cold War. Over the past several 
decades, Tokyo has reluctantly given up its passive 
security policy stance and gradually relinquished for-
mer pacifist principles. New challenges and the in-
creased expectations of Japan’s ally, the US, have led 
Japan to adjust its policies. North Korea’s missile and 
nuclear program and China’s gradual rise as an eco-
nomic and military power, in particular, have forced 
the country into closer security cooperation with 
Washington, which in the event of a crisis would also 
require Japan to contribute militarily. 
In view of the complex security environment, the 
Abe administration seeks to better protect the country 
from security risks and influence regional develop-
ments to Japan’s advantage. The alliance with the US 
remains the linchpin of Japan’s foreign and security 
policy. Closer cooperation with the US is aimed at en-
hancing the deterrence effect. At the same time, Japan 
is diversifying its security policy relations. In terms 
of content, Abe has to a large extent followed on from 
initiatives and considerations already in existence. 
Compared with his predecessors, however, he has pur-
sued security policy adjustments and reforms more 
vigorously and at a faster pace. This applies, for in-
stance, to the plans for establishing a National Secu-
rity Council, which have been under discussion for 
years, or the relaxation of arms export guidelines. Abe 
has endeavored to cultivate diverse foreign and secu-
rity policy relationships by making an unprecedented 
number of diplomatic trips abroad. In just over a year 
in office, he traveled to 49 countries, setting a record 
for number of visits made by a Japanese post-war 
premier.205 
Abe’s security policy constitutes a continuation of 
two trends of the past several years. First, Tokyo has 
been working to strengthen security cooperation out-
side of its alliance with the US. The priority target 
205  The previous record-holder was Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi, who in his approximately five and a half years in 
office visited 48 countries. See “Premier’s Travel Log Totals 47 
Countries”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 August 2014, http://the-japan-
news.com/news/article/0001471631 (accessed 5 August 2014). 
group includes Australia and India as well as several 
Southeast Asian countries. The new partnerships com-
plement Japan’s current security policy, which is 
aligned almost exclusively with Washington. Given 
the decline in US hegemony and the numerous regional 
challenges, Japan is seeking additional partners in 
order to increase its room for maneuver. Dialogue 
with individual countries serves to sound out con-
cordant interests that can be pursued jointly. This co-
operation-oriented foreign policy is essential in view 
of the fact that the economic power Japan has thus far 
used to influence international events is dwindling. 
The network of primarily bilateral relationships will 
open up new opportunities for Japan to play a larger 
security role in East Asia in the future. 
Second, Japan has continued its “normalization 
process” under Abe, through which the country is 
gradually relaxing its restrictions on the use of armed 
forces and military resources. The Prime Minister is 
unusually open in his criticism of Japan’s traditional 
passiveness and the categorical rejection of military 
force as part of security policy, in which up until now 
only individual self-defense was allowed. To him it is 
evident that the idealistic pacifism of the post-war 
period is incompatible with today’s geopolitical real-
ities. Abe’s reforms, such as the reinterpretation of 
Article 9 or the amendment of the Development Char-
ter, only legitimize what the Japanese government in 
fact already practices. For example, Tokyo has for 
years reframed cases of collective self-defense as indi-
vidual self-defense, such as the deployment of Japa-
nese armed forces in the Indian Ocean as part of the 
“war on terrorism”.206 Abe’s revisions in the areas of 
collective self-defense, arms exports and development 
aid render the legitimatizing acrobatics of the past 
unnecessary. 
In the course of the “normalization” that Japan has 
gone through, Article 9 of the Constitution – the article 
relevant to security policy – has been reinterpreted, 
but not reworded or removed. The majority of the 
206  Axel Berkofsky, Die Neuen Amerikanisch-Japanischen Leitlinien 
für Verteidigungskooperation: Implikationen für Japans regionale 
Sicherheitspolitik [The new US-Japanese guidelines for defense 
cooperation: Implications for Japan’s regional security policy], 
(Münster, 2005), 278. 
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Japanese population remains opposed to changing 
this article, which symbolizes the country’s rejection 
of militarism. Skepticism with regard to the use of 
military power is deeply rooted. It is therefore not sur-
prising that Abe has foundered on domestic resistance 
in his attempt to amend the Constitution. Because 
of the anti-military stance of the population, the gov-
ernment must thoroughly discuss and explain every 
change of course in Japan’s military policy. Thus, 
there seems to be little danger of Japanese militarism 
flaring up again. Without a reform of Article 9, how-
ever, Japan’s security policy will continue to operate 
in a zone of tension between constitutional principle 
and political practice. 
Two weaknesses in Japan’s security policy have 
become clearly evident under Abe. First, the govern-
ment has thus far been unable to dispel mistrust in 
China and South Korea of Tokyo’s enhanced security 
role. Historically both countries have suffered greatly 
under Japanese military dominance and harbor sus-
picions against Abe’s reforms and initiatives. They find 
it problematic that Japan is expanding its role without 
having accounted for the past. Instead, Abe has trivial-
ized Japan’s war crimes in East Asia and visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are also honored. 
Abe’s criticism is certainly used by China’s govern-
ment to divert attention from domestic grievances. 
But this does not change the fact that Japan must 
show more willingness to come to terms with it 
history. 
Second, Tokyo lacks creative ideas on how to im-
prove the security situation in East Asia. This will be 
possible only on the basis of mutual trust. But Japan’s 
unwillingness to confront its history continues to 
obstruct the development of constructive relation-
ships with China and South Korea. Instead of pro-
moting regional stability, Abe’s policy of focusing on 
values further exacerbates Japan’s rivalry with China. 
Moreover, Tokyo is so disillusioned by the ineffectuali-
ty of multilateral institutions and security fora that it 
has little interest in reviving and enhancing them. The 
Japanese government’s current policy toward North 
Korea and Russia attests to the fact that its current 
course of security diversification is not aimed at bol-
stering multilateralism. Rather, Tokyo is – reluctantly 
– pursuing bilateral rapprochement with both coun-
tries, which runs counter to multilateral efforts to 
deal with the Ukraine crisis and North Korea’s nuclear 
program. 
The continuity in Japan’s security policy over the 
last few years shows that there is a consensus among 
the country’s political elite regarding the tasks and 
priorities in this policy field. Hence, irrespective of 
what party is in office Tokyo is likely to continue to 
strive for a more active role in the region. The precise 
shape Japan’s involvement will take, however, can 
only be partially foreseen. Japan is apparently pre-
pared to respond resolutely to gray-zone disputes in 
order to preserve its territorial integrity. By reinforc-
ing Japan’s military capacities, reinterpreting Article 
9, and coordinating crisis response plans more closely 
with Washington, Tokyo contributes to burden-shar-
ing in the alliance and thus to a US-centered security 
architecture in the region. Furthermore, Japan is sup-
porting US strategy by cooperating with countries like 
Australia, India and the Philippines to which the US 
also attaches great importance. In light of the anti-
militaristic stance of its own population, Tokyo is at 
best likely to exercise the right to collective self-defense 
in support of the US. However, regional partners can 
hope for Japanese support in developing their military 
and paramilitary capabilities (capacity building assis-
tance). It remains unclear whether Japan will in the 
long run content itself with its role as a junior partner 
in the alliance with Washington or whether it might 
cautiously strive to emancipate itself. 
Persistent economic stagnation and the public 
deficit, which has climbed to a record-breaking level, 
limit Japan’s ability to implement its security agenda. 
In addition, the country has suffered a loss of regional 
influence because it is no longer seen among Asian 
countries as a role model for economic development. 
Whether Tokyo can muster the financial resources 
needed to undergird its security policy in future de-
pends on the success of “Abenomics”, Abe’s economic 
policy. 
Despite the shortcomings and risks, Japan’s current 
security policy also presents opportunities, since Tokyo 
is apparently prepared to assume responsibility for 
regional and international stability. Accordingly, the 
former presidents of the European Council and the 
European Commission, Herman Von Rompuy and José 
Manuel Barroso, welcomed Japan’s efforts to expand 
its security role at a meeting with Abe in May 2014.207 
Europe should regard Tokyo’s efforts to diversify its 
security relationships as an opportunity to jointly 
develop and realize concrete projects, such as estab-
207  22nd EU-Japan Summit: Joint Press Statement, ed. Council of 
the European Union (Brussels, 7 May 2014), 7, http://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ 
142520.pdf (accessed 2 August 2014). 
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lishing and enforcing binding rules and norms for the 
peaceful resolution of disputes. It would make sense, 
for example, for the two sides to collaborate on setting 
up rules to govern the “global commons”. Japan and 
Europe are economically dependent on the unlimited 
use of the high seas, airspace, outer space and cyber-
space. Binding rules could prevent power rivalries and 
territorial claims from endangering the global trade 
routes in the South China and East China Seas. China 
should be integrated into such initiatives so that it 
does not perceive them as directed against it. At the 
same time, the EU could propose ways to revitalize 
and more effectively shape security dialogues in East 
Asia. 
For the US, with its long-undisputed leadership role 
in the region, the rise of China constitutes a challenge. 
Asia’s future order could become more competitive 
and potentially more instable. Should a military con-
flict arise, the EU would be directly affected due to 
close trade relations. Thus, it is in Europe’s interest 
to devote more attention to the security challenges is 
East Asia. It is essential that Europe intensify the secu-
rity dialogue with Asian countries, including Japan. 
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